

Negotiation in War: The 19.45% Discount

Eric Min*

Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of the post-1945 international environment on the maintenance and termination of interstate wars. I theorize that the immense growth of international norms and institutions promoting peace after the Second World War has significantly decreased the signaling costs that belligerents incur for engaging in intra-war diplomacy, while also increasing the costs for avoiding it. Consequently, warring states have greater leeway—or necessity—to enter negotiations without any interest in finding peace, but are also better able to cease hostilities without reaching conclusive outcomes. I collect a new dataset on negotiations for all interstate wars from 1816 to present to evaluate these claims. I find strong evidence that post-1945 wars, particularly involving nuclear belligerents, see more frequent negotiations. However, these negotiations are often far less productive. These original data and insights establish a dynamic framework that enables a more policy-relevant study of conflict management, highlights a historical angle to conflict resolution, and speaks to the utility of viewing diplomacy an essential dimension to understanding war.

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1 Introduction

What effect has the post-1945 international order had on the trajectory and resolution of conflicts?

Besides the observation that interstate wars have become less frequent ([Goldstein 2011](#); [Sarkees et al. 2003](#)), relatively little scholarship has explicitly analyzed whether and how the post-1945 environment has actually shaped the way in which wars are executed and managed prior to their resolution. Interestingly, many contemporary works on conflict focus exclusively on hostilities after 1945. Implicit to this choice is the belief that something is different about the previous era, but such differences are not articulated or explored.

At first glance, a study of wars extending back more than seventy years may sound anachronistic or irrelevant to generating findings that can inform contemporary theory and policy. However, the dramatic shifts that occurred around 1945 not only define the backdrop for contemporary conflicts, but can also provide valuable leverage to understand what factors influence the efficacy of different modes of conflict resolution.

I contend that a far more active and peace-promoting environment after 1945 has substantially changed the nature of war, though perhaps not in the most obvious or desirable manner. Significant structural, normative, and institutional changes since 1945 have created an environment that constantly promotes peace, diplomacy, and maintenance (or recovery) of the status quo. While the proactive promotion of peace may sound auspicious, this post-1945 environment has severely diluted the reputational and informational costs of engaging in intra-war negotiations.¹ This has had numerous consequences on conflict, both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. There is, however, one main consequence: Negotiations in wars before 1945 tend to be very infrequent and quickly create peace, while negotiations after 1945 tend to be much more frequent but less productive in forging peace.

I substantiate these proposals by gathering new daily-level data that tracks diplomatic activity across the last two centuries of inter-state wars. This new resource allows for an unprecedented analysis of intra-war dynamics that provides strong support for my theoretical expectations, but also sheds remarkable light on our greater theoretical and empirical understandings of conflict.

¹“Negotiation” refers to direct communication between parties with the ostensible aim of creating a mutually acceptable agreement” ([Iklé 1964](#)). This includes mediation and shuttle diplomacy. I provide more detailed definitions later in this paper when discussing how I operationalize negotiations in my new data.

The inclusion of negotiations into studies of war may affect our overall understanding of the dynamics behind war duration and termination, as well as conflict resolution more generally. Most studies of war have adopted approaches that either lack intra-war dynamics or make strong but untested assumptions. Many have also undervalued the role of negotiations as a critical element of understanding when, why, and how conflicts come to an end. Two-thirds of interstate wars end with a negotiated settlement (Leventoğlu and Slantchev 2007), yet few efforts have been made to explicitly study when and how diplomacy is reintroduced in the midst of hostilities. Any reasonable hope of developing useful policy and theory relies on a more refined understanding of how fighting and negotiating both affect the bargain of war.

My larger project seeks to develop a theoretical framework on the use of negotiations in the midst of war. Any strategic logic relies on both the costs and benefits of engaging in an activity—in this case, diplomacy during conflict. This particular paper emphasizes how systemic-level changes impact belligerents' perceived costs regarding negotiations and war termination in the midst of war. Elsewhere, I speak more systematically to the potential benefits of negotiation in post-1945 conflicts.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 further explores broad patterns in war and how they differ before and after 1945. Section 3 lays out a theoretical framework for understanding these observations through a historical perspective that places emphasis on the diplomatic dimension of conflict resolution, leading to the main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the new data accumulated to assess these ideas. Analysis follows in Section 5. We then close with concluding thoughts and suggestions for future work in Section 6.

2 Time Matters

Most quantitative war scholarship has taken an ahistorical approach to understanding how wars occur and end. Numerous studies and databases of interstate and intrastate conflict begin their analysis after 1945, precluding any comparisons across what many would consider to be a qualitatively important temporal break.²

²For example, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Dataset begins at 1946. The International Conflict Management dataset by Bercovitch (1992) also begins at 1945. In civil war literature, see Fearon and Laitin (2003); Huth et al. (2011); Kaplow (2016); Kocs (1995); Licklider (1995); Mueller (2004); Walter (2009), and Walter (2009).

	A Win	B Win	Impasse	Transform	<i>Total</i>
Pre-1945	39 (0.68)	17 (0.30)	1 (0.02)	0 (0.00)	57
Post-1945	15 (0.39)	9 (0.24)	9 (0.24)	5 (0.13)	38
<i>Total</i>	54	26	10	5	95

Table 1: COW interstate war outcomes. Numbers in parentheses represent proportions within time periods.

	Pre-1945	Post-1945
Negotiated Settlements	41 (0.73)	27 (0.72)
Formal Agreements	32 (0.57)	5 (0.14)
Ceasefire/Truce/Withdrawal	9 (0.16)	22 (0.58)
Military Victory/Defeat	13 (0.23)	7 (0.18)
End/Transition	3 (0.05)	4 (0.11)

Table 2: Specific manners in which wars ended. Numbers in parentheses are proportions within time periods. Proportions do not exactly add up to 1 due to rounding.

Two recent exceptions are [Fazal \(2013\)](#) and [Fortna \(2009\)](#), who note that a larger share of wars have ended without a clear victor, without a formal peace treaty, and through ceasefires since 1945. Tables 1 and 2 use data from the Correlates of War (COW) interstate dataset to showcase these patterns.

[Fazal \(2012, 2013\)](#) ascribes this change to the growth of international law, and how states are less prone to formally declare war or to sign documents that could subject their leaders or soldiers to extra-state jurisdiction. [Fortna \(2009\)](#) identifies the advent of peacekeeping as the main reason for fewer victories after 1945. The two thus emphasize, at least indirectly, the role of significant normative and institutional changes before and after World War II.

Both are important and entirely plausible ideas, but they are also incomplete in a couple ways. First, these explanations largely speak to the logic of how wars end, yet provide few implications for how wars are conducted or managed up to that terminal point. Wars do not randomly end, nor do the initial conditions at the outset of war fully predict the terms of its conclusion. A comprehensive understanding of war must analyze how the trajectory of war actively influences belligerents' calculations about terminating conflict. This is particularly essential for war scholarship to have practical utility for real-world conflict management and resolution.

Second, and on a related note, simply tracking which side wins or loses overlooks an important pattern: the prevalence of diplomatic and negotiated efforts to end wars across both time periods. According to my own data on intra-war negotiations (described in Section 4), an overwhelming

majority of wars—80%—feature negotiations at some point in the midst of hostilities. As shown in Table 2, more than two-thirds of all wars end in negotiated agreements (Phillipson 1916; Pillar 1983; Leventoğlu and Slantchev 2007). The timing and occurrence of negotiations also varies widely within and across wars.³ Once it is acknowledged that diplomatic bargaining ends when wars start, we immediately see that the resumption of negotiations in the midst of conflict is a distinct choice that a belligerent must make. Negotiations are a necessary condition for belligerents to make concessions short of surrender in the face of total defeat. Understanding when and why diplomatic communications occur would thus shed substantial light on whether war bargaining can be better understood as a war of attrition (Fearon 2013; Langlois and Langlois 2009, 2012; Powell 2017), a convergence process (Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Slantchev 2003; Smith and Stam 2004), or something else.

Scant scholarship has explicitly considered the strategic motivations and calculus behind intra-war negotiations, or the fact that the nature of negotiated settlements has also changed over time: While two-thirds of wars before and after 1945 have ended in negotiated settlements, ceasefires comprise less than one-fifth of pre-1945 settlements but over four-fifths after 1945. In most conflicts, the tool that failed to initially stem a war is eventually reintroduced in an apparent effort to end it. Such observations suggest that diplomatic negotiations may play a critical—but thus far, largely neglected—role in bridging the wide gap between theories and histories of conflict.

A lack of reliable data on intra-war activity has dictated a research agenda that minimizes, among other things, negotiation’s place in war. Studies of conflict initiation adopt a costly lottery assumption that leaves no room for the discussion of fighting or diplomatic bargaining once parties opt to engage in hostilities (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). A great deal of quantitative scholarship also adopts what could be called a “cannonball” approach where fixed or initial factors such as relative capabilities, democracy, geographic contiguity, and the like influence the duration and termination of these conflicts (Bennett and Stam 1996; Goemans 2000; Slantchev 2004).⁴

Meanwhile, most bargaining models of war assume that negotiations occur throughout the conflict. Each round of war involves a proposal over how to split a resource, and then leads to a round of fighting (a “battle”) if the offer fails (Filson and Werner 2002, 2007; Powell 2004; Slantchev

³I will illustrate this point using new data in Section 4.

⁴Bennett and Stam (1996) do include some analyses with time-varying covariates, but using the war-year as the unit of analysis. This limits the ability to disaggregate most conflicts.

2003; Smith and Stam 2004; Wagner 2000). In these models, diplomacy is primarily used as a device to signal one's resolve and constantly adjusts in response to fighting outcomes. This obviates the choice of whether to negotiate and precludes the possibility of suffering costs for attempting to engage in diplomacy during war.

These observations collectively suggest that a rigorous study of war requires three refinements past our current research. First, negotiations must take a central role in ascertaining when, why, and how conflicts are managed and brought to an end. Second, we need a more detailed understanding of how the post-1945 environment has affected the conduct of war. Third, wars cannot only be understood by their initiation and termination, but also their conduct in the middle of active conflict—an endeavor that requires systematic data on intra-war dynamics.

The remainder of this paper addresses these points.

3 The Price of Diplomacy

Scholars have studied how costs from the battlefield may affect belligerents' willingness to continue fighting a war (Filson and Werner 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998; Klingberg 1966; Weisiger 2016). Given that we know belligerents do not constantly negotiate during wars, we must also consider what costs influence belligerents' willingness to engage in diplomatic activity that could potentially bring hostilities to an end.

A primary cost of negotiating is that it is likely to signal weakness (Van Evera 1999; Vego 2007). As Schelling (1960) states, "one side or both may fear that even a show of willingness to negotiate will be interpreted as excessive eagerness" (53). A substantial pool of economics literature has made this point from the opposite end, suggesting that refusal to negotiate can be used as a signaling mechanism concerning one's resolve (Admati and Perry 1987; Binmore et al. 1986; Cramton 1992). Given that wars are largely motivated by information asymmetries, the first request for talks may signal that a party is suing for peace. This could motivate the opponent to fight harder or to make more extreme demands, as it believes that the requesting party must be in a dire situation (Pillar 1983). Even in the height of the Berlin Crisis, as East Germany began construction of the Berlin Wall, the Kennedy administration considered reaching out to the Soviets to de-escalate but worried that "the Soviets... will interpret a willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness and will step up

their threats.”⁵ Beyond emboldening the opponent, seeking diplomacy may also demotivate the military forces of the requesting state, as they believe that further efforts are unnecessary or that peace is at hand (Iklé 1971; Lombardi 2009).

These risks are compounded by the fact that negotiations require *mutual* consent. A state that makes the first move of seeking talks may be left dangerously exposed, having indicated a willingness to settle the conflict while obtaining nothing in return. It is worth emphasizing here that having one’s request to negotiate rejected is fundamentally different from having one’s proposal rejected conditional on negotiations already taking place. Some formal models of war make such a simplification where extreme offers are considered equivalent to not negotiating.⁶ Such an approach presumes that the two sides are communicating to one another constantly and updating their bargaining positions in response to each battle. This assumption undermines the study of negotiations as a strategic choice and is not supported by the empirical record. New data collected, described in Section 4, indicates that negotiations only occur in 16% of all war days, and that only about 7% of all recorded battles are followed by any form of diplomatic discussions within the next week.

3.1 Historical Examples of Costs

Three brief cases help further demonstrate how states at war are sensitive to the initiation of negotiations and their potential effect in sending negative signals to domestic and international audiences.

The Russo-Japanese war was fueled by clashing ambitions involving the Korean peninsula and Manchuria and began with a brief exchange of naval fire in Port Arthur on February 8, 1904. By July, both Japanese and Russian leaders were independently formulating conditions for peace. At the end of the year, as it suffered continued losses against Japan, Russia was privately willing to cede Port Arthur—a major concession. These changes all occurred in the midst of active hostilities, with neither side aware of the other’s diplomatic posture. By March 1905, Japan had handily beaten Russia on the battlefield and sought to end the war. Tellingly, despite reaching a clear victory, the Japanese government was extremely concerned about the optics of a victor seeking negotiations.

⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1962, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962*, ed. Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 126.

⁶ See Slantchev (2003) or Fearon (2013) for two examples.

Envoy Kaneko Kentaro asked for president Theodore Roosevelt to propose mediation efforts, and for him to do so without mentioning Japan's request, expressly to avoid the stigma of being first to ask for peace (Kowner 2006; White 1964). Russia formally accepted an American mediation offer in June and reluctantly agreed to a "humiliating peace" in the Treaty of Portsmouth (Esthus 1981).

During the first three months of the Korean war, from June 25 to mid-September of 1950, unprepared South Korean and American troops were quickly driven down the peninsula and risked complete defeat. An ambitious amphibious landing at Incheon by the United Nations Command dramatically turned the tide of conflict and pushed the war past the 38th parallel and near the Chinese border. In October and November, Chinese forces launched an unexpected and massive intervention on North Korea's behalf, forcing back the United Nations Command. Around that time, as the war literally went south, the Truman administration contemplated proposing an armistice. This idea was eventually shot down over fears that such a gesture would indicate weakness and undercut any bargaining leverage that would exist if talks were to occur (Kennan 1972; Pillar 1983). It was once Jacob Malik, Soviet delegate to the United Nations, proposed ceasefire talks by radio on June 23, 1951 that both belligerents were able to save face and agree to diplomatic discussions. Two years of difficult negotiations also demonstrated that the two sides were nowhere near agreement when they first met on July 10, 1951.

In the early stages of US involvement in the Vietnam War, both American and Vietnamese elites were highly cognizant of how seeking negotiations could prove costly. On March 25, 1965, attempting to blunt domestic opposition to the war, President Johnson publicly stated that he was "ready to go anywhere at any time" to find an "honorable peace." This announcement occurred in parallel to Operation Rolling Thunder and was meant to give Johnson latitude to remain resolute without escalating hostilities further (VanDeMark 1991). The declaration likely failed in that regard. It instead signaled weakness to the North Vietnamese, worried the South Vietnamese, and energized domestic opponents to the conflict (Gibbons 1994). Conversely, in discussions with the Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, the North Vietnamese Ambassador demanded the cessation of bombing to initiate any negotiations but also mentioned that "when North Vietnam showed an

interest in negotiations Americans had taken such interest as a sign of weakness and with results of stronger escalation.”⁷

These snapshots indicate that belligerents clearly place the choice of negotiating in a serious light and perceive large costs from its employment and potential failure.

3.2 The 19.45% Discount

Engaging in diplomacy during war can incur serious costs that may actually have consequences on the continued conduct of the conflict. However, shifting attitudes toward war as a form of statecraft over the last century have dramatically modified these costs to intra-war negotiations. At least three major interconnected changes, some of which find their origins in the aftermath of the First World War, account for shifting attitudes toward war as a form of statecraft after 1945. Importantly, they also had dramatic impacts on the costliness of negotiations during war.

First, the end of the Second World War opened a path for a liberal world order seeking economic interdependence, institutionalized rules, and hopes of great power cooperation to promote peace (Haas 2017; Ikenberry 2011).⁸ While the League of Nations—founded in 1920—and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 sought to avoid the use of war as an instrument of statecraft, a liberal order did not truly gain its footing until after WWII. The San Francisco Conference, which produced the Charter of the United Nations on October 24, 1945 (less than two months after Japan’s formal surrender), symbolized that nascent order. This founding document explicitly highlights the desire “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Since then, a growing number of able and willing third party mediators—ranging from economic, legal, to political—have bolstered that pacific effort (Boehmer et al. 2004; Pevehouse et al. 2004; Shannon 2009).

Second, laws of war became far more robustly codified. The formalization of international laws of war, which began with the Hague Convention in 1899, took a “quantum leap” with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and post-war trials in Nuremberg, Tokyo, and Manila (United States Army 2015). Scholars may disagree on whether compliance with laws of war reflects self-interests, robust

⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume V, Vietnam, 1967*, ed. Kent Sieg (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 201.

⁸ Keohane (1984) speaks to the general utility of institutions as a manner for states in anarchy to communicate and coordinate their actions. Risse-Kappan (1996) discusses how organizations may socialize states into cooperation.

international enforcement, or internalized norms, but these laws do appear to matter and reflect changes in state behavior (Morrow 2007; Von Stein 2005).

Third, while leaders and the public questioned the legitimacy of war after WWI (Wright 1924), the violence of WWII consolidated a normative aversion to conflict (Mueller 2004). In particular, norms regarding territorial integrity and border fixity have become integral sources of stability in the current international system (Atzili 2011; Carter and Goemans 2011; Goertz et al. 2016; Zacher 2001). The increase in democracies worldwide, which produces more states with institutional and normative motivations for avoiding conflict, reduced wars within a growing pool of like-minded states (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). The advent of nuclear weapons also may have incentivized belligerents to avoid conflict for fear of devastating consequences should hostilities get out of hand (Osgood 1957; Schelling 1960; Halperin 1961; Waltz 1979).

The cumulative effect of these factors has been to create an environment that strongly encourages diplomacy and maintenance of the status quo (Hanania 2013; Jervis 1989; Levy 1992). International actors have become far more assertive in promoting these robust attitudes toward stability and have the tools to support this cause. Specifically, these new structural, institutional, and normative pressures for peace have reduced the historically high costs of negotiating, since negotiations can be framed as acceding to the will of the international community rather than a plea of one's own accord.⁹ Going further, constant external pressures to manage conflicts and promote diplomacy have increased the costs to avoiding diplomacy in post-1945 conflicts. Iklé (1964) bluntly describes the pervasive pressure to negotiate, even if it is only to placate external parties:

Governments that negotiate in order to win public approval value the act of negotiating as the Pharisee values prayer. It is not the thoughts behind the prayer that matter, or the purpose pursued, or the deeds before and after—what counts is that the ceremony be performed with the proper gestures. (53-54)

These changes suggest that the propensity and effects of negotiations change before and after 1945. Prior to 1945, warring parties typically have to make overtures on their own, which presents the substantial risk of signaling weakness to both domestic and international audiences.

⁹Technological advancements could plausibly decrease some material and temporal costs to arranging and traveling to negotiations in later conflicts. Even so, advancements such as the telegraph and steam locomotive were commonplace by the mid-nineteenth century, approximately one century before 1945. Additional analysis in Appendix D shows that the nineteenth century does not effectively explain the increase in negotiations for more recent conflicts.

After 1945, these risks to negotiation drop substantially. None of this is to say that negotiations become costless or that states do not feel worried about looking irresolute to their opponent. The aforementioned examples from the Korean and Vietnam Wars exhibit this concern. But as these same wars illustrate, after 1945, belligerents are more protected from looking weak and actually can avoid scorn by acceding to talks. This leads to the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 Negotiations occur more frequently in wars after 1945 than before 1945.

More talking does not necessarily generate more progress. Before 1945, negotiations are less frequent because belligerents only use them when absolutely necessary—that is, when the large costs of diplomacy are outweighed by the costs to continued conflict. The start of negotiations indicates a willingness and agreement to codify mutually shared expectations and understandings based on the battlefield. Negotiations should therefore quickly lead to the termination of hostilities. Returning to the Russo-Japanese War, Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries had their first meeting on August 10, 1905. Since both sides entered discussions fully aware that Japan was the victor, talks moved somewhat swiftly. A comprehensive agreement was arranged by September 1, and the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5—575 days into the war and 26 days after talks began.

In contrast, the post-1945 international environment ratchets external pressure and dilutes costs for belligerents to settle—or at least to look interested in settlement. When negotiations become less costly to conduct and more costly to avoid, belligerents are freer to use diplomacy to accrue benefits that are unrelated to forging peace, such as placating external parties which are constantly seeking peace (Iklé 1964; Pillar 1983). Negotiations no longer indicate genuine interest in the offering of concessions or the resolution of conflict, but rather an attempt to manage political pressures. The Korean and Vietnam Wars are again instructive. The first negotiation of the Korean conflict took place at Kaesong on July 10, 1951, over a year after hostilities began. The chasm in positions between the two sides was readily apparent. It would take 481 days of unproductive negotiations spread over two years to finally reach an agreement by July 27, 1953.

Delegates from the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong met in Paris on May 10, 1968 to discuss a settlement for the Vietnam conflict. It was not until January 16, 1969—251 days after talks began—simply for the delegations to agree upon a table configuration

(Kitchens 1974). The Paris Peace Accord would not be signed until January 27, 1973, following 2,132 total days of negotiations.

In effect, the links between negotiations and concessions that hasten war termination are relatively tight before 1945 and then become more decoupled after 1945. This leads to the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 Intra-war negotiations before 1945 are associated with higher likelihood of conflict termination relative to those after 1945.

Finally, it is worth noting that my argument would predict that more post-1945 wars end with ceasefires and other inconclusive modes of termination—a pattern which I mentioned at this paper’s outset. Prior to 1945, belligerents faced heavy costs for seeking negotiations, forcing them to “fight to the finish” to settle problems on their own (Fortna 2004; Svensson 2009). The post-1945 environment allows warring states to negotiate and stop fighting without exhaustively settling the key issues that triggered the conflict—a scenario that would not have been tenable in the past.¹⁰ Fazal (2012) and Fortna (2009) both identify and partially explain the prevalence of inconclusive wars after 1945. Given that this pattern in inconclusive post-1945 wars is already known, I do not propose it as an explicit hypothesis but do point out that my theoretical discussion of international pressure and the importance of negotiations can provide a supplementary explanation.

3.3 Historical Examples on the Post-1945 Environment

My theoretical discussion has touched upon several wars. Below, I briefly explore two more post-1945 conflicts to show how belligerents perceive costs to negotiations and how the international environment can reshape these costs.

First is the Falklands War of 1982. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Argentina has disputed the United Kingdom’s claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. This disagreement came to a head on April 2, 1982, when Argentinian forces staged an amphibious landing on the islands. On the next day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 503, which called for

¹⁰However, stopping conflicts in these “unnatural” settings may increase the likelihood of a future relapse (Werner and Yuen 2005). Note that the desire to stop fighting is not equivalent to the settlement of the issues that initiated the war. For example, each of the Arab-Israeli wars sought to destroy Israel. The ceasefires that ended them did not satisfy any party. The fact that multiple Arab-Israeli wars took place shows that the fundamental issue was not resolved.

the immediate cessation of hostilities and a diplomatic solution. Despite the United Kingdom's support of this resolution, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher immediately indicated disinterest in a negotiated settlement (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990). On April 5, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig began an aggressive round of shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires. The effort made middling progress before the Argentinian government accused the United States of "tilting" toward the British position and ended talks at the end of the month (Kleiboer and 't Hart 1995). Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry attempted to build upon Haig's work in early May by bringing Argentina (where it had greater influence than the United States) back to the table. When 1,000 Argentinian forces died at the sinking of the light cruiser *Belgrano* on May 3, Buenos Aires refused mediation for fear of looking weak. However, two days later, the Argentinian government agreed to mediation by UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. The United Kingdom felt it had no other choice but to also accept. In her memoirs, Prime Minister Thatcher lamented the fact that she was "under an almost intolerable pressure to negotiate for the sake of negotiation" (Thatcher 1993). Unenthusiastic bargaining occurred through most of May. The United Kingdom had no interest in peace, and indeed stalled in order to give its naval task force time to cross the Atlantic. Once British forces landed on May 21, international efforts including UN Security Council Resolution 505, as well as renewed diplomatic offers by Belaúnde Terry and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, failed to stop the fighting. British forces arrived and overtook the islands by June 13, and the Argentinians signed a document of surrender on June 15, 1982.

The second is the Cenepa Valley War of 1995. After fighting a brief border war in July of 1941, which was based on grievances reaching back to the early nineteenth century, Ecuador and Peru signed an agreement called the Rio Protocol in 1942. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States were to serve as guarantors of this deal. By 1960, however, Ecuador disputed the agreement's applicability to the Cenepa area and declared the deal null and void (Simmons 2005). For decades, the guarantor states constantly urged the two parties to recognize and complete the demarcation (Marcella 1995). Years of contained tension erupted into hostilities on January 26, 1995. The importance of international actors soon became apparent. With neither side wanting a protracted war, both Ecuador and Peru sought the diplomatic cover of the four historic guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol. Those four countries, themselves concerned about the conflict, met in Brazil on January 31 and offered their mediation services. Ecuador and Peru swiftly accepted (Mares and

Palmer 2012). On February 28, the belligerents signed the Montevideo Declaration, which called for “an immediate and effective ceasefire.” Hostilities ended without confronting the core issue; the actual border dispute that initiated the conflict was not settled until October 1998.

With all this in mind, we now turn to the assessment of my hypotheses.

4 Data

Tests of the aforementioned implications require a variable that tracks the occurrence of wartime negotiations. To that end, I create new daily-level data on diplomatic activity across 92 COW interstate conflicts since 1816.¹¹ I broadly base dates for war onset and termination, as well as identities of active belligerents, on the COW Inter-state War Dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).¹²

4.1 Negotiating

I follow work on international diplomacy by Iklé (1964) and define negotiations as direct communication between parties with the ostensible aim of creating a mutually acceptable agreement. In the context of war, this includes direct talks between only the belligerents, as well as mediation efforts where both sides actively participated. Mediation can occur in a single location where the belligerents are guided by a third party, but shuttle diplomacy where a third party serves as an itinerant interlocutor also qualify. Peace missions where the third party fails to get the consent of the warring states are not included, since no direct communications take place. The word “ostensible” is important in this definition, as we do not have to—nor can we consistently—presuppose the actual intention of negotiations. Belligerents may genuinely seek peace, or they may hope to mollify international pressures without a concrete interest in settlement.

In creating data on these negotiations, I consult over 400 historical texts, primary documents, and periodicals. Many sources come from an annotated bibliography by Shirkey and Weisiger (2012), but a more complete list of references can be provided upon request. I use this information

¹¹Three wars were removed due to lack of reliable data on battles and/or diplomacy: the 1968-1973 Second Laotian War, the 1970-1971 Communist Coalition War, and the five-day Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1987.

¹²Some war initiation dates are adjusted by one or two days to reconcile minor differences based on dates of battles. A couple wars feature more significant changes in termination dates to reflect the cessation of hostilities. For example, COW uses February 26, 1871 (the signing of peace preliminaries) as the end of the Franco-Prussian War, but the war effectively stopped with a ceasefire on January 28.

Era	No Negotiation	Negotiation
Both	30,956 (0.837)	6,042 (0.163)
Pre-1945	21,584 (0.904)	2,291 (0.096)
Post-1945	9,372 (0.714)	3,751 (0.286)

Table 3: Distribution of the negotiation variable.

to generate a dummy variable that indicates whether negotiations took place between any active belligerents on a given day.¹³


Table 3 shows the distribution of this variable in my data, both in aggregate and split apart by time period. We see that approximately 9.6% of war-days feature negotiations in pre-1945 wars, and that the number rises substantially to 28.6%—a nearly three-fold increase—for post-1945 conflicts. This contrast provides preliminary evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.

To supply additional context for these new data, Subfigure 1a shows the timing of the first negotiation across all COW interstate wars.¹⁴ 74 of 92 conflicts, or 80%, experience at least one negotiation. The variability in their timing is high, emphasizing that negotiations are a complex and irregular activity. Most bargaining models of war, which assume a constant exchange of proposals throughout the conflict, make formal analysis tractable but paint over this variation. Subfigures 1b and 1c show how many negotiation efforts take place in each of the 92 wars, as well as the lengths of these individual efforts. Wars with negotiations tend to undergo three or fewer talks, and these talks often last less than two weeks.


Figure 2 uses kernel regression smoothers to summarize the trajectory of intra-war negotiations before and after 1945. The smoothed lines indicate what proportion of wars involved negotiations at some point during the overall conflict, normalized to fit on a 0–1 continuum. The contrast across the two time periods is dramatic and provides preliminary evidence in support of my argument. Pre-1945 wars feature fewer negotiations. When they do occur, negotiations tend to quickly settle the war. This is evident from the large spike in negotiations at the right-hand side of this figure. Belligerents, whether they fear looking weak or feel unrestrained to keep fighting, often refuse to negotiate until diplomacy becomes absolutely necessary. After 1945, we see a large bulge in negotiations in the middle of the plot, suggesting that these wars feature much more frequent

¹³I do not distinguish between publicly known and secret negotiations, though that may be useful in future work.

¹⁴Duration is clearly endogenous to the conflict. These plots are merely for illustrative purposes.



(a) Proportion of war elapsed prior to first negotiation. Light bar represents wars with no negotiations. (b) Number of negotiations per war. Light bar represents wars with no negotiations.



(c) Lengths of negotiations in days.

Figure 1: Descriptive statistics for negotiations.




Figure 2: Prevalence of negotiations over the course of wars.

negotiations that fail to end the conflict. Negotiations return in frequency and eventually end wars later.

These data amount to 36,998 war-day observations on diplomatic activity.¹⁵ 24,121 of these observations are from before 1945, ranging from the 1823 Franco-Spanish War to World War II. The remaining 13,173 total observations range from the 1947 Kashmir War to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

5 Analysis

For Hypothesis 1, the outcome variable of interest is the occurrence of negotiations. The explanatory variable is an indicator that tracks whether a war took place before or after October 24, 1945—the establishment of the United Nations. Since the last war to occur before 1945 is the Franco-Thai War (1940) and the first after 1945 is the Kashmir War (1947), the specific date used for this cut-point is not important.

For Hypothesis 2, which focuses on the end of wars, the likelihood of conflict termination is the main dependent variable. The explanatory variable is an interaction between the post-1945 and negotiation indicators.

I discuss model selection for each hypothesis as I present results below.

¹⁵More descriptive statistics of these data are in Appendix A.

5.1 Control Variables

Several control variables common to studies of war duration and termination are included in many of my analyses. A couple others tracking battlefield activity are derived from new data I have collected on fighting outcomes for all wars in my negotiation dataset. Descriptive statistics for all variables are available in Appendix A.

- *Issue salience*: Belligerents may be more willing to fight harder when a conflict involves existential threats, which are often linked to wars with serious credible commitment issues. I use the classification scheme developed by Holsti (1991) and extend it to cover more recent wars. Each side's most important issue area related to the war is categorized as being, in decreasing order: regime/state survival (2), a territorial or ideological dispute (1), or a commercial or policy dispute (0). The highest category among all belligerents is used to measure overall salience.
- *Contiguity*: Wars between more distant belligerents may be difficult to supply or manage (Slantchev 2004). Conflicts between neighboring states may not only be easier to fight, but involve more familiar parties and difficult issues such as territorial claims. As such, conflicts between neighbors have a greater tendency to escalate (Diehl 1985). Utilizing the COW Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002), I create a dummy variable for wars where belligerents share a land or river border.
- *Capability ratio*: States with greater industrial and military capabilities are more likely to succeed in fighting. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) measure from the National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987) is used for this task.¹⁶ For each side in the war, the annual CINC measures of all active belligerents are added together, with adjustments made when belligerents in multilateral wars enter and exit. I take the higher total and divide that by the lower total. As such, the minimum value of 1 indicates equal capabilities, and larger values express increasing disparities.
- *Democracy*: A trove of democratic peace literature, far too extensive to address here, expects democracies to be more discerning, credible and effective—yet impatient—belligerents in war

¹⁶The CINC score is used to provide more holistic results, but any of the individual component measures could also be used.

(Filson and Werner 2004; Reiter and Stam 2002; Schultz 1999).¹⁷ It is therefore crucial to account for whether belligerents are democratic, particularly given the rise in democracies after 1945. Indeed, about one-quarter of wars before 1945 involve a democratic belligerent; this rises to one-half after 1945. A binary measure based on Polity (Marshall et al. 2016) tracks whether either side is democratic.¹⁸

- *Interwar period*: The Kellogg-Briand Pact, the League of Nations, and the Paris Peace Conference were all attempts to prevent future armed hostilities, much less another Great War. While history suggests that these efforts were fruitless, some of the dynamics I outline regarding the post-1945 environment certainly found their origins in this inter-war period. To capture these potential effects, a dummy variable is thus included to indicate war-days between the end of the First World War (November 11, 1918) and the end of the Second (September 2, 1945).
- *Post-Cold War*: Despite a lack of literature on changes before and after 1945, a great deal of scholarship reflected on how the end of the Cold War and the bipolar order would affect international relations (Gaddis 1992-1993; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Mearsheimer 1990; Russett 1993; Waltz 2000). A dummy variable indicates whether a war-day occurs after December 26, 1991—the day on which the Soviet Union dissolved.
- *Battlefield activity*: This paper focuses on how systemic shifts affect overall negotiation patterns in war. However, differences in battlefield activity could play a large role in determining negotiation patterns (Min 2017). I address this by including daily-level measures of *position* and *momentum* on the battlefield. I discuss how these data are collected and created in greater detail in Appendix B. In essence, I calculate a sum of the outcomes of all battles that occurred from the beginning of the war (position) and over the last 30 days of the war (momentum). These totals are converted into absolute values to simply account for imbalances on the battlefield, regardless of sides. Lastly, I track the cumulative intensity of hostilities by counting the total number of *completed battles* up through each day of the war.

¹⁷For two prominent dissenting opinions, see Farber and Gowa (1995) and Desch (2002).

¹⁸I opt to use a binary measure for at least two reasons. First, some studies call the apparent exactitude of Polity's measures into question (Treier and Jackman 2008). Second, 15% of the observations involve states without precise Polity scores. Although these country-years may lack specific scores, it is relatively non-controversial to classify them as being democratic or not.

5.2 Results

We now proceed to the main findings.

5.2.1 Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 asserts that negotiations should be more frequent in post-1945 wars. Given the centrality of this claim, I assess it using a variety of methods.

First, as I previously mentioned and showed in Table 3, 9.6% of total war-days feature negotiations in wars prior to 1945. This number rises to 28.6% after 1945.

Second, I calculate the proportion of days spent negotiating in each individual war. Figure 3 is a boxplot showing these proportions, split by time period. The higher propensity to negotiate in wars after 1945 is quite apparent.

Third, I use a series of regressions to show that these differences are also robust to more statistical rigor. In Models 1 and 2 of Table 4, I regress the proportion of each war spent in negotiations (the basis for Figure 3) on a binary variable indicating whether the war took place before or after 1945. In both cases, the positive effect is strong.¹⁹

Models 3, 4, and 5 delve deeper and use the war-day as the unit of analysis. I regress the occurrence of a negotiation on the post-1945 indicator. Since this post-1945 variable does not change within wars, I adopt two approaches to account for war-level heterogeneity. Models 3 and 4 use war random effects, and the latter includes various controls. The two models continue to show support for Hypothesis 1, though the effect's statistical significance is attenuated to the 90% level. Model 5 is a logistic regression that includes a battery of controls, a lagged dependent variable, and standard errors clustered by war.²⁰ The positive impact of the post-1945 environment continues to remain strong. As such, in support of Hypothesis 1, both descriptive and statistical results show that negotiations are far more frequent in recent wars.

I have a strong theoretical reason to use 1945 as a historical cut-point and the basis of my indicator variable, but one may wonder whether other years would more effectively fit the data. I provide additional statistical evidence that identifies 1945 as being an important year in Appendix D.

¹⁹The specific values for the controls in Model 2 are based on data from the first day of the war.

²⁰The inclusion of war fixed effects would lead to issues of separation.




Figure 3: Proportion of war spent negotiating.

Table 4: Results of generalized linear regressions for Hypothesis 1.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Pr(Negotiation)		Negotiation		
	<i>OLS</i>		<i>Mixed effects logistic</i>	<i>Logistic</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-1945	0.121*** (0.045)	0.115** (0.054)	0.886* (0.484)	1.422* (0.793)	0.505*** (0.134)
Issue salience		-0.051 (0.039)		-1.309** (0.566)	-0.490*** (0.126)
Contiguity		-0.058 (0.047)		-0.374 (0.666)	-0.419*** (0.123)
CINC ratio		0.001 (0.001)		0.038*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)
Democracy		0.014 (0.049)		-2.525*** (0.125)	0.093 (0.129)
Interwar period		0.020 (0.060)		0.477 (0.905)	0.109 (0.152)
Post-Cold War		0.046 (0.089)		1.470 (1.307)	-0.153 (0.395)
<i>Position</i>				-0.031*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)
<i>Momentum</i>				-0.125*** (0.015)	0.030 (0.047)
Completed battles				0.043*** (0.003)	-0.004** (0.002)
Constant	0.117*** (0.027)	0.197*** (0.065)	-2.985*** (0.287)	-1.598* (0.931)	-4.387*** (0.214)
War REs			✓	✓	
Lagged DV					✓
Observations	92	92	36,998	36,998	36,998

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

5.2.2 Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 predicted that negotiations should be positively linked to the termination of war prior to 1945, but that this effect should be relatively lower after 1945. Because negotiations are so costly to seek in pre-1945 wars, belligerents only engage in diplomacy when absolutely necessary—that is, when they feel confident about the war’s outcome and are prepared to settle. While belligerents in post-1945 conflicts may engage in negotiations to settle wars, they also negotiate to live up to normative and institutional pressures that are not related to their interest in settlement. This should muddle what used to be a clear link between diplomacy and the conclusion of hostilities.

I assess this proposal using a Cox proportional hazard model, which is appropriate for analyzing issues of event duration and termination.²¹ My main explanatory variable is an interaction between the post-1945 indicator and my negotiation variable.

Before proceeding to that main analysis, it is illustrative to examine the independent effect of negotiations on the termination of conflict, without taking 1945-related changes into account. Models 1 and 2 of Table 5 show that, in isolation, negotiations indeed have a highly positive impact on the likelihood of wars coming to an end on any given day. This effect is remarkably robust to the inclusion of other controls. The highly significant result for momentum also indicates that clear battlefield trends appear to have an impact on belligerents’ interests in ending a conflict.²² Overall, the strong positive coefficient for negotiations provides some justification for the costly lottery perspective of war, where negotiations—if they matter at all—are a mere mechanism to codify the outcomes of a conflict once it has effectively come to an end (Fearon 1995).

This ostensibly simple relationship changes once we account for a systemic shift after 1945. Model 3 of Table 5 features only the interaction but is telling nonetheless. The coefficient for the negotiation variable, which now represents pre-1945 negotiations, increases in magnitude relative to Models 1 and 2. However, the interaction term is *negative*, indicating that negotiations in post-1945 wars have a far diminished impact on war termination. This change is robust to the inclusion of all control variables.

²¹The model here includes standard errors clustered by war. Appendix E redoes all hazard models in the main text using frailty models that help account for unobserved heterogeneity regarding wars.

²²See also Weisiger (2016).

Table 5: Cox proportional hazard models on war termination, addressing Hypothesis 2.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	War termination			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Negotiation	1.777*** (0.216)	1.750*** (0.228)	2.478*** (0.284)	2.448*** (0.306)
Post-1945			1.536*** (0.424)	0.951** (0.395)
Post-1945 × Negotiation			−2.091*** (0.539)	−1.538*** (0.470)
Issue salience		−0.539** (0.243)		−0.480* (0.257)
Contiguity		0.281 (0.255)		0.397 (0.270)
CINC ratio		0.004 (0.005)		0.004 (0.005)
Democracy		0.235 (0.242)		0.298 (0.252)
Interwar period		−0.172 (0.281)		−0.507 (0.330)
Post-Cold War		0.333 (0.434)		0.255 (0.439)
<i>Position</i>		−0.002 (0.016)		0.007 (0.017)
<i>Momentum</i>		0.209*** (0.039)		0.204*** (0.041)
Completed battles		−0.005 (0.004)		−0.010*** (0.004)
Observations	36,998	36,998	36,998	36,998
Events	92	92	92	92
Clustered SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Interaction terms are not intuitive to understand. To help make these results easier to grasp, Figure 4 uses Model 4 to calculate the marginal effect of negotiations on the termination of conflict before and after 1945.²³ The highly positive link between negotiations and war termination is clear before 1945. Diplomatic communication in pre-1945 conflicts leads to relatively swift settlements. Once we turn to post-1945 conflicts, the marginal effect of negotiations on termination remains positive, but its magnitude drops by approximately two-thirds and the effect just barely retains its statistical significance at the 95% level.

Figure 4 shows that even though post-1945 wars typically conclude with negotiated settlements, far more negotiations take place that do not help forge peace. The fact that so many unproductive negotiations occur after 1945 is an indication that other factors inform belligerents' increased willingness to negotiate. However, it is worth reemphasizing that most post-1945 conflicts do end through negotiations, so it is not fair to dismiss all diplomacy as being unproductive. Additional research is necessary to understand what other considerations help to explain when and why particular post-1945 war negotiations help forge peace. I begin to tackle this issue in my second paper.

My assessment of Hypothesis 2 treats negotiations as an exogenous variable. One may be concerned about the validity of this assumption, especially when Hypothesis 1 treats negotiations as the main outcome. In Appendix F, I address this issue by using a multistate model. A multistate model is essentially a series of stratified hazard models that can treat war as a series of state transitions which include war without negotiations, war with negotiations, and war termination.




Figure 4: Marginal effect of negotiations on the termination of conflict, using Model 4 from Table 5. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

²³See Brambor et al. (2006) for more details on interaction models and how to calculate marginal effects.

Doing so allows us to analyze how a variable impacts the likelihood of negotiations starting, as well as how that same variable can affect the likelihood of negotiations leading to conflict termination. In effect, the multistate model allows negotiations to naturally arise. The results of the multistate model corroborate the findings of Hypothesis 2, but also speak to Hypothesis 1: Compared to pre-1945 wars, post-1945 wars have negotiations that are much more frequent, durable, and less likely to terminate conflict.²⁴

5.2.3 Atomizing the Post-1945 Effect

My primary hypotheses and analysis involve a somewhat blunt comparison between pre-1945 and post-1945 wars. While I demonstrate a higher overall propensity to negotiate in more contemporary conflicts, it is unlikely that these incentives are equally salient across all post-1945 wars. We would ideally be able to leverage some aspect of the post-1945 environment in order to better understand why negotiations occur when they do—and with relative frequency—in modern wars.

Nuclear weapons provide an obvious candidate. The possibility that conflicts could escalate to nuclear hostilities may help severely increase the costs to avoiding negotiations during wars after 1945. As a part of maintaining limited warfare and precluding devastating misunderstandings, belligerents may feel greater pressure to maintain open channels of communication (Osgood 1957; Schelling 1960; Halperin 1961; Waltz 1979). This pressure may arise internally from a nuclear belligerent’s concerns about escalation, or from third parties that are equally concerned about the possible deployment of atomic weapons.

Importantly, while nuclear weapons remain an overarching presence after 1945, the potential for their use varies across conflicts. *Wars involving belligerents with nuclear weapons pose a far greater risk than wars with non-nuclear countries, and thus should be associated with higher likelihood of negotiations.*

In order to assess this, I use the Nuclear Production Capabilities Dataset (Jo and Gartzke 2007) to track whether either side of the war has at least one nuclear belligerent.²⁵ Of 13,173 war-days after 1945, 5,182 (39.5%) involve at least one nuclear belligerent.

²⁴I opt to present a standard hazard model in the main text since it is familiar to more readers and produces similar substantive results.

²⁵Table 1 of Jo and Gartzke’s codebook better summarizes the nuclear element of this variable. Only declared nuclear states and de facto nuclear states are used for this measure; “near nuclear states” are not.




Figure 5: Marginal effect of negotiations on the termination of conflict, using Model 3 from Table 7. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table 6 displays four logistic regressions that focus only on post-1945 conflicts and that use nuclear belligerents as the main explanatory variable. Models 1 and 2 include war fixed effects. The very large coefficient estimates for nuclear belligerents in Models 1 and 2 (as well as the post-Cold War period in Model 3) are likely consequences of the variable being a strong predictor that is also time-invariant within wars. Including war fixed effects may risk separation in these data. As an alternative, Models 3 and 4 include a lagged dependent variable. The magnitude of the nuclear variable is now more contained. All four models present strong evidence that, in post-1945 conflicts, the direct involvement of nuclear powers is a powerful predictor of when negotiations are more likely to occur.

Additional analysis shows that nuclear belligerents are not only an important element to understanding post-1945 negotiation patterns, but may be the driving force. Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 replicates Models 4 and 5 from Table 4 respectively, but includes the nuclear belligerent variable. Models 3 and 4 return to the full Cox proportional hazard model in Table 5, but now include the nuclear variable. Figure 5 displays marginal effects for Model 3. Across all replications, the nuclear variable exhibits results similar to what we previously saw using the post-1945 indicator, and the statistical significance of the post-1945 variable disappears.

These results might make one believe that nuclear weapons entirely capture the changed costs to diplomacy after 1945, and that institutional and normative changes are irrelevant. There are still several reasons to believe that such a conclusion is short-sighted.

First, a multistate model where negotiations exist as a potential state shows that the post-1945 environment and nuclear belligerents do not play identical roles in explaining the use and effects of

Table 6: Logistic regressions on negotiations for post-1945 data, accounting for nuclear belligerents.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Negotiation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nuclear belligerent	19.278*** (0.424)	20.373*** (0.097)	1.100*** (0.152)	1.131*** (0.235)
Issue salience		-1.350*** (0.391)		0.018 (0.269)
Contiguity		5.908*** (0.564)		0.098 (0.263)
CINC ratio		0.003 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.005)
Democracy		-2.869*** (0.197)		-0.099 (0.244)
Post-Cold War		-14.481*** (0.641)		0.046 (0.377)
<i>Position</i>		-0.044*** (0.011)		0.023*** (0.008)
<i>Momentum</i>		-0.154*** (0.029)		0.012 (0.068)
Completed battles		0.071*** (0.013)		-0.012 (0.011)
Constant	-0.084 (0.130)	-1.981*** (0.628)	-4.966*** (0.138)	-5.060*** (0.465)
Lagged DV			✓	✓
War FEs	✓	✓		
Clustered SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,088	13,088	13,123	13,088

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Logistic regressions and survival models on negotiations and war termination for all data, accounting for nuclear belligerents.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Negotiation		Termination	
	<i>ME Logit</i>	<i>Logit</i>	<i>Cox PH</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Negotiation			2.242*** (0.256)	2.448*** (0.306)
Nuclear belligerent	5.957*** (0.241)	1.245*** (0.193)	1.177* (0.503)	0.710 (0.527)
Post-1945	-0.986 (0.866)	0.163 (0.161)	-0.404 (0.341)	0.553 (0.482)
Nuclear × Negotiation			-2.959*** (0.754)	-1.619* (0.860)
Post-1945 × Negotiation				-0.953 (0.557)
Issue salience		-0.484*** (0.116)	-0.474* (0.246)	-0.488* (0.255)
Contiguity		-0.260** (0.122)	0.373 (0.273)	0.395 (0.275)
CINC ratio		-0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Democracy		-0.176 (0.126)	0.309 (0.262)	0.272 (0.267)
Interwar period		0.228 (0.146)	-0.470 (0.321)	-0.513 (0.330)
Post-Cold War		0.151 (0.362)	0.517 (0.446)	0.386 (0.441)
<i>Position</i>	0.048*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.008 (0.015)	0.006 (0.017)
<i>Momentum</i>	-0.089*** (0.014)	0.052 (0.040)	0.192*** (0.039)	0.205*** (0.041)
Completed battles	0.026*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.004)	-0.010*** (0.004)
Constant	-4.063*** (0.539)	-4.413*** (0.200)		
Lagged DV		✓		
Events			92	92
Observations	36,998	36,906	36,998	36,998

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

diplomacy. The results in Appendix F show that nuclear belligerents help negotiations to begin and persist, but they have no effect on whether negotiations influence the settlement of war. Instead, the post-1945 variable continues to have a negative impact on the likelihood of negotiations leading to conflict termination. This suggests that some other quality of the post-1945 environment still helps to explain why belligerents come to the table without any intention or need to find peace.

Second, the qualitative record makes clear that non-nuclear belligerents felt considerable incentives to practice diplomacy. The Cenepa Valley War between Ecuador and Peru, which I discussed above, is one case. In addition, one of the most negotiation-heavy conflicts after 1945 is the 1986–1987 War over the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya. Repeated diplomatic efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and individual African nations—none of which possessed nuclear weapons—brought the two nations into a series of fruitless negotiations before both relented to an OAU-organized ceasefire in September 1987.²⁶ In neither of these wars were nuclear weapons ever a remotely plausible option. Instead, territorial norms, aversion to continued conflict, and active international organizations created forces that promoted conflict management.

Third, research on post-1945 civil wars also shows that third-party pressures may increase incentives for negotiations (Kaplow 2016), yet also undermine the termination of conflict (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Beardsley 2011; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002; Werner and Yuen 2005). These works do not rely on data as fine-grained as what I utilize in this study, yet their results provide corroborating evidence that international pressures for peace reshape the costs to engaging in or avoiding negotiations, even when conflicts explicitly involve sub-state actors that have no connections to atomic weaponry.

Nuclear weapons play an undeniable part in incentivizing the containment and resolution of wars. Nevertheless, these three counterpoints indicate that nuclear weapons likely enhance, and do not fully represent, the multitude of factors that promote the use to negotiations in post-1945 conflicts.

²⁶Consistent with the point that post-1945 conflicts tend to end inconclusively, the ceasefire did not resolve the issue over the Aouzou Strip. A formal agreement, granting the land to Chad, was not signed until May 1994 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

6 Conclusion

While the existence of armed conflict is permanent, its nature is not. Military historians have carefully tracked the transformation of tactics, weapons, and strategy over time (Parker 2005); political scientists have noted the decades-long rise in intra-state conflict and asymmetric warfare (Arreguín-Toft 2001; Fearon 2004; Sullivan 2007). Much less attention has been placed on how the post-1945 environment has affected the overall management of conflict, particularly at the proverbial bargaining table.

Aided by a host of new daily-level war negotiation data, I have developed part of a theoretical framework that highlights several crucial consequences that the post-1945 world has had on the management of conflict. The Second World War sparked a series of structural, normative, and institutional changes that embodied an acute aversion to armed conflict, hopes of a pacific international community, and desire “to maintain international peace and security” (United Nations 1945).

This systemic-level transition radically shifted the calculus and behavior of parties that still enter into conflicts. Belligerents experienced far fewer risks and greater benefits from engaging in diplomacy, even when they had no incentives to make concessions or settle. As such, the post-1945 environment establishes two competing dynamics: States may use negotiate more often without any interest in peace, but may also be more willing to stop fighting when fighting proves inconclusive.

Some of these ideas regarding conflict may seem intuitive in retrospect, or find echoes in civil war literature. This study is unique, however, in taking the 1945 line seriously and leveraging it to theorize and assess the calculus of conflict. This admittedly brings about a “big-picture” theory regarding a seismic systemic change where causally identified relationships are difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Regardless, the ramifications are clear and direct a spotlight on diplomatic and dynamic aspects of war that have been sidelined. The results are also substantively important, as they present a serious set of risks and caveats to the institution and norms-rich environment in which we live.

The policy and welfare implications of these results are unclear as they currently stand. On one hand, if negotiations may be associated with prolonged conflict and the prevention of comprehensive settlements, this is troubling and points toward giving war a chance (Luttwak 1999). On the other hand, wars after 1945 have been slightly shorter on average, and a decent portion of wars halted

by ceasefires have remained quiescent thus far.²⁷ Furthermore, war duration is a dubious measure of welfare losses, and we have yet to create adequate alternatives to gauge war’s destructiveness.²⁸ While [Weisiger \(2016\)](#) has amassed a month-level dataset of military casualties across interstate wars, civilian casualties are unfortunately becoming more relevant in protracted conflicts ([Downes 2006, 2008](#); [Valentino et al. 2006](#)). Besides human costs, economic costs have been understudied, as have the effects of increasingly lethal conventional weaponry.²⁹ The dilatory effects of post-1945 war negotiations are clearly troubling, but further research is required to figure out whether the ability to let belligerents save face and reach “unnatural” agreements outweighs the costs of letting those same parties sometimes engage in empty negotiations.

Domestic institutions may play an important role in further tests regarding the costliness of intra-war diplomacy. Even though all states may harbor reputational concerns with seeking talks, democracies are likely to also be concerned with undermining domestic support for the war effort in a manner that non-democracies are not. In discussing how wars historically end, [Iklé \(1971\)](#) states that “[n]othing is more divisive for a government than having to make peace at the price of major concessions. The process of ending a war almost inevitably evokes an intense internal struggle if it means abandoning an ally or giving up popularly accepted objectives” (59). Recent work on autocracies finds that non-democratic leaders are also held accountable for failing to live up to their promises ([Weeks 2008, 2012](#)). Nonetheless, democratic leaders must corral a much larger pool of opinion and are more likely to require citizens’ material and human sacrifices to sustain a war effort.³⁰ Greater insights on this topic may produce richer theories regarding sources of democratic peace and of the democratic advantage in international competition ([Reiter and Stam 2002](#); [Schultz and Weingast 2003](#)).

By no means should this paper be construed to argue that the last seventy years of institutional and normative innovation have been counterproductive. Instead, these findings indicate that the relationship between fighting, negotiating, and terminating wars is far more complicated in the contemporary environment. Negotiations tend to be less successful in forging peace, yet they do

²⁷The average war lasts 422 and 409 days before and after 1945, respectively. These averages fall to 394 and 284 once the shortest and longest war are removed from each era.

²⁸[Hegre \(2004\)](#), however, begins with the premise that longer (civil) conflicts amount to greater suffering.

²⁹Some exceptions regarding wartime costs include [Bellamy and Zajtcuk \(1991\)](#); [Collier \(1999\)](#); [Glick and Taylor \(2010\)](#); and [Mansfield and Pevehouse \(2000\)](#).

³⁰This could be framed in the language of selectorate theory, where democracies rely on a much larger winning coalition that goes beyond a small group of elites ([Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003](#)).

often manage to create relatively stable (albeit less formal) agreements. An additional dimension of strategy must explain the role of negotiations in an international environment that actively encourages diplomacy—that is, why some negotiations appear to help end hostilities, while many others seem to extend them.

I work toward an answer for that question in my second paper.

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Below are descriptive statistics for all wars, also broken down to pre-1945 and post-1945. Table 1 provides some summaries of several features of war, such as their average length, proportion of time spent in negotiations, and so on. Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics of the variables used in the statistical analysis.

Table 1: Summary statistics at the war level.

		Min.	1Q	Med.	Mean	3Q	Max.
War length (days)	<i>All</i>	5.00	59.75	152.00	402.15	443.00	3735.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	7.00	67.00	181.00	418.90	507.00	2175.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	5.00	31.00	93.00	374.90	262.50	3735.00
Battle length (days)	<i>All</i>	1.00	1.00	3.00	20.50	13.00	2075.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	1.00	1.00	3.00	21.64	13.00	2075.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	1.00	2.00	5.00	14.89	14.00	326.00
Negotiation length (days)	<i>All</i>	1.00	1.00	6.00	27.96	22.25	1306.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	1.00	2.00	9.00	19.24	28.00	187.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	1.00	1.00	4.00	38.66	20.00	1306.00
Number of negotiations	<i>All</i>	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.92	3.00	18.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.48	3.00	12.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.73	3.00	18.00
Total battles	<i>All</i>	1.00	3.50	6.00	17.92	12.00	453.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	1.00	4.00	7.00	24.00	15.00	453.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	1.00	3.00	6.00	8.79	8.75	50.00
First neg. (prop. of war)	<i>All</i>	0.00	0.21	0.66	0.60	0.99	1.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	0.00	0.30	0.62	0.58	0.94	1.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	0.00	0.04	0.19	0.32	0.50	1.00
Prop. w/ negotiations	<i>All</i>	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.16	0.23	1.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.12	0.17	0.52
	<i>Post-1945</i>	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.24	0.47	1.00

Table 2: Summary statistics for continuous variables.

		Min.	1Q	Med.	Mean	3Q	Max.
Issue salience	<i>All</i>	0.00	1.00	2.00	1.54	2.00	2.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	0.00	1.00	2.00	1.57	2.00	2.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.49	2.00	2.00
CINC ratio	<i>All</i>	1.00	1.64	3.06	10.35	8.96	165.80
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	1.00	1.76	2.91	7.12	8.32	78.99
	<i>Post-1945</i>	1.00	1.45	3.74	16.24	30.86	165.80
 Position 	<i>All</i>	0.00	1.00	4.00	9.49	10.00	160.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	0.00	1.00	4.00	8.39	10.00	160.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	0.00	2.00	4.00	11.50	13.00	43.00
 Momentum 	<i>All</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.01	1.00	24.00
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.24	2.00	24.00
	<i>Post-1945</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.59	1.00	11.00

Table 3: Summary statistics for binary variables.

		0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Negotiation	<i>All</i>	30,956 (0.837)	6,042 (0.163)
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	21,584 (0.904)	2,291 (0.096)
	<i>Post-1945</i>	9,372 (0.714)	3,751 (0.286)
Democratic belligerent	<i>All</i>	26,737 (0.723)	10,261 (0.263)
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	17,600 (0.737)	6,275 (0.263)
	<i>Post-1945</i>	9,137 (0.696)	3,986 (0.304)
Contiguity	<i>All</i>	16,793 (0.454)	20,205 (0.546)
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	10,952 (0.459)	12,923 (0.541)
	<i>Post-1945</i>	5,841 (0.445)	7,282 (0.555)
Interwar period	<i>All</i>	27,363 (0.740)	9,635 (0.260)
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	14,240 (0.596)	9,365 (0.404)
	<i>Post-1945</i>	N/A	N/A
Post-Cold War	<i>All</i>	35,221 (0.952)	1,777 (0.048)
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	N/A	N/A
	<i>Post-1945</i>	11,346 (0.865)	1,777 (0.135)
Nuclear belligerent	<i>All</i>	31,786 (0.859)	5,212 (0.141)
	<i>Pre-1945</i>	23,845 (0.999)	30 (0.001)
	<i>Post-1945</i>	7,941 (0.605)	5,182 (0.395)

Appendix B: Battle Outcome Variables

My overall research project seeks to analyze the strategy of negotiations during war. In other parts of this endeavor, battlefield outcomes are a central factor that help to explain when and why negotiations occur.³¹ This particular paper is more focused on systemic shifts and the identities of belligerents, so battlefield activity is not a primary consideration. I still include these measures here as important controls. This appendix describes these data and measures. Even greater technical details are available in an appendix of the second paper.

Raw Data

Past works on battlefield activity have utilized the U.S. Army's Concepts Analysis Agency Database of Battles, Version 1990, which is also abbreviated as CBD90 (Ramsay 2008; Reiter and Stam 1998). The CBD90 covers the years 1600 to 1982 and records 660 battles across 65 wars. While it is the most historically sweeping dataset, the CBD90 suffers several known flaws regarding coverage, consistency, and bias toward Western conflicts (Desch 2002).

As such, I amass a new dataset of 1,702 battles from 92 wars. The backbone of this dataset is based on work by Jaques, who defines a battle as “any clash between organised forces of combatants” (Jaques 2007, xii). Battles are admittedly difficult to define, and my data will not capture very low-level battlefield activity. Nonetheless, battles are a principal unit of combat and a vital manner in which to understand the incurring of casualties or changing of military situations (Dupuy 1987; Eggenberger 1985). I use several supplementary sources for more information.³²

Table 4 displays the number of individual battles recorded for each war in my new battle dataset (BDS). As a reference, I also show the number of battles included in the U.S. Army's Concepts Analysis Agency Database of Battles, Version 1990 (CBD90) dataset. The CBD90 is the predominant quantitative resource on interstate war battles and covers 660 battles between 1600 and 1982.

For each battle, I code the date(s) on which the battles occurred; which side began the battle (the “attacker”); and which side confronted the battle (the “defender”). I also record which party won, if any, along two different dimensions. One is whether the victor is the initiator or target

³¹For example, see Min (2017).

³²See Clodfelter (2008); Eggenberger (1985); Showalter (2014); and (Young 1977).

Table 4: Comparison of battles in the new battle dataset (BDS) and existing Concepts Analysis Agency Database of Battles (CDB). Note that the CDB does not distinguish between the two Balkan Wars, instead listing five battles for “The Balkan Wars.”

#	War	BDS	CDB	#	War	BDS	CDB
	<i>Pre-1816</i>		156	136	Nomonhan	1	
1	Franco-Spanish	2		139	World War II	453	193
4	First Russo-Turkish	6		142	Russo-Finnish	8	1
7	Mexican-American	27	8	145	Franco-Thai	6	
10	Austro-Sardinian	11	1	147	First Kashmir	7	
13	First Schleswig-Holstein	7		148	Arab-Israeli	25	9
16	Roman Republic	3		151	Korean	41	11
19	La Plata	5		153	Off-shore Islands	3	
22	Crimean	30	2	155	Sinai War	6	4
25	Anglo-Persian	4		156	Soviet Invasion of Hungary	1	
28	Italian Unification	9	2	158	Ifni War	5	
31	First Spanish-Moroccan	3		159	Taiwan Straits	1	
34	Italian-Roman	2		160	Assam	4	
37	Neapolitan	7		163	Vietnam War, Phase 2	50	1
40	Franco-Mexican	29		166	Second Kashmir	8	
43	Ecuadorian-Colombian	2		169	Six Day War	10	22
46	Second Schleswig-Holstein	3		170	Second Laotian, Phase 2	1	
49	Lopez	32		172	War of Attrition	10	1
52	Naval War	4		175	Football War	2	
55	Seven Weeks	25	1	176	Communist Coalition	1	
58	Franco-Prussian	57	10	178	Bangladesh	14	
60	First Central American	5		181	Yom Kippur War	11	33
61	Second Russo-Turkish	26		184	Turco-Cypriot	5	
64	War of the Pacific	13		186	War over Angola	18	
65	Conquest of Egypt	4		187	Second Ogaden War, Phase 2	6	
67	Sino-French	9		189	Vietnamese-Cambodian	3	
70	Second Central American	1		190	Ugandian-Tanzanian	2	
73	First Sino-Japanese	15		193	Sino-Vietnamese Punitive	1	
76	Greco-Turkish	7		199	Iran-Iraq	27	
79	Spanish-American	17	1	202	Falkland Islands	7	
82	Boxer Rebellion	7		205	War over Lebanon	5	1
83	Sino-Russian	8		207	War over the Aouzou Strip	6	
85	Russo-Japanese	18	6	208	Sino-Vietnamese Border War	5	
88	Third Central American	2		211	Gulf War	8	
91	Fourth Central American	3		215	Bosnian Independence	9	
94	Second Spanish-Moroccan	4		216	Azeri-Armenian	5	
97	Italian-Turkish	12		217	Cenepa Valley	8	
100	First Balkan	11	2.5*	219	Badme Border	5	
103	Second Balkan	8	2.5*	221	War for Kosovo	1	
106	World War I	342	124	223	Kargil War	1	
107	Estonian Liberation	4		225	Invasion of Afghanistan	6	
108	Latvian Liberation	3		227	Invasion of Iraq	6	
109	Russo-Polish	8	2				
112	Hungarian Adversaries	5			<i>Post-1816, but not in interstate COW</i>		
115	Second Greco-Turkish	18			American Civil War	(357)	49
116	Franco-Turkish	5			Zulu War	(10)	2
117	Lithuanian-Polish	5			Transvaal Revolt	(4)	1
118	Manchurian	14	5		Egypt and the Sudan	(23)	2
121	Second Sino-Japanese	9			Boer War	(57)	5
124	Chaco	19			Spanish Civil War	(41)	1
125	Saudi-Yemeni	1					
127	Conquest of Ethiopia	12	1		Total	1,702	660
130	Third Sino-Japanese	16			Total for COW	1,702	444
133	Changkufeng	1			Total for 20th c.	1,322	419




Figure 2: Distributions of the fighting measures.

Constructing Measures

I use these raw scores to make daily-level measures of battlefield activity.

For a war w , each constituent battle is expressed as $b_{w,i}$, where i is an index that orders battles chronologically by their end date. Note that $b_{w,i} \in \{-v, -1, 0, 1, v\}$ depending on the specific outcome; see Table 5 in the main text. Each day t can be represented by the sum of all battle outcomes that occurred on that particular day. Call this daily sum of a war $s_{w,t}$.

On a day t of war w , $|Position|$ is absolute value of the cumulative total of all daily sums for the entire war. Formally,

$$|Position_{w,t}| = \left| \sum_{i=1}^t s_{w,t} \right|$$

$|Momentum|$ is calculated in the same manner, except only using the last d days of a conflict.

$$|Momentum_{w,t}| = \left| \sum_{i=\max\{1,t-d\}}^t s_{w,t} \right|$$

For both measures, a value of 0 indicates parity and higher values indicate mounting cumulative wins by one side.³⁴ Figure 2 shows the distribution of these two measures.

Appendix C presents a series of plots using these two measures.

³⁴The correlation between *momentum* and *position* is 0.349.

Appendix C: Example Battle Outcome Plots

This appendix provide plots of $|Position|$ and $|Momentum|$ over time for several additional wars covering a wide range of time and space.

Figure 3: Crimean War (1853 – 1856)




Figure 4: Franco-Prussian War (1870 – 1871)




Figure 5: Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 1905)




Figure 6: World War II (1939 – 1945)




Figure 7: Korean War (1950 – 1953)




Figure 8: Vietnam War, Phase 2 (1965 – 1975)






Figure 9: War over Angola (1975 – 1976)**Figure 10: Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988)**

Appendix D: The Year 1945 as a Cutpoint

In this appendix, I address the utility of using 1945 to represent a systemic shift in the costs and benefits of negotiating during war. I do this using two relatively unsupervised methods that allow the data to identify their own patterns. First, I perform a series of bivariate logistic regressions. In each regression, I regress negotiations on a dummy variable that changes from 1825 to 2000 in five-year intervals. I create dummy variable that takes the value 0 before year y and 1 during/after the year y , where y is the sequence 1825, 1830, ..., 1995, 2000.

Figure 11 displays the Akaike information criteria (AIC) for these regressions. A dummy variable situated around 1945 produces the lowest AIC, which indicates the best fit of all competing models.




Figure 11: AICs for a bivariate logistic regression, using different cutpoints for the binary variable. Solid vertical line indicates 1945.

Second, I create a time series that tracks the number of war-days (if any) involving negotiations across all wars in every year from 1823 to 2003. I then apply a structural breakpoint model that determines structural breaks in these patterns of negotiation in an unsupervised manner. This model identifies two key years: 1945 and 1972. The year 1972 reflects a sharp drop-off in negotiations, largely driven by the tail end of Paris peace talks during the Vietnam War.

Appendix E: Frailty Models

The main text's analysis uses standard errors clustered by war. However, there may be concerns that other forms of unobserved heterogeneity exist in the data for which the control variables cannot account. The inclusion of a frailty term for wars (which are effectively random effects in the Cox proportional hazards framework) can help resolve this.

Table 6 replicates Table 5 in the main text, but uses a frailty model. Figure 13 presents the corresponding marginal effects. We see that the main findings are unchanged.




Figure 12: Marginal effect of negotiations on the termination of conflict, using a frailty model (Model 4). Bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table 6: Frailty models on war termination, addressing Hypothesis 2.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	War termination			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Negotiation	2.000*** (0.239)	1.996*** (0.255)	2.583*** (0.296)	2.448*** (0.306)
Post-1945			1.562*** (0.433)	0.951** (0.395)
Post-1945 × Negotiation		−2.203***	−1.538*** (0.555)	(0.470)
Issue salience		−0.615** (0.306)		−0.480* (0.257)
Contiguity		0.582* (0.350)		0.397 (0.270)
CINC ratio		0.008 (0.006)		0.004 (0.005)
Democracy		0.237 (0.329)		0.298 (0.252)
Interwar period		−0.323 (0.408)		−0.507 (0.330)
Post-Cold War		0.023 (0.610)		0.255 (0.439)
<i>Position</i>		−0.025 (0.020)		0.007 (0.017)
<i>Momentum</i>		0.227*** (0.049)		0.204*** (0.041)
Completed battles		−0.011* (0.006)		−0.010*** (0.004)
Observations	36,998	36,998	36,998	36,998
Events	92	92	92	92
Frailty term (War)	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7 repeats the same exercise, focusing on nuclear belligerents instead of the post-1945 variable. Figure 5 displays the marginal effects of negotiations depending on whether a nuclear belligerent is present in the war. These results echo those in the main text.




Figure 13: Marginal effect of negotiations on the termination of conflict, using the frailty model (Model 1). Bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table 7: Frailty models on war termination, accounting for nuclear belligerents.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	War termination	
	(1)	(2)
Negotiation	2.393*** (0.272)	2.451*** (0.307)
Nuclear belligerent	1.371** (0.583)	0.714 (0.528)
Post-1945	-0.204 (0.419)	0.553 (0.482)
Nuclear × Negotiation	-3.010*** (0.774)	-1.622* (0.860)
Post-1945 × Negotiation		-0.954 (0.557)
Issue salience	-0.554* (0.284)	-0.489* (0.255)
Contiguity	0.533 (0.330)	0.397 (0.275)
CINC ratio	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)
Democracy	0.260 (0.319)	0.271 (0.268)
Interwar period	-0.370 (0.403)	-0.510 (0.331)
Post-Cold War	0.221 (0.557)	0.385 (0.442)
<i>Position</i>	0.016 (0.018)	0.006 (0.017)
<i>Momentum</i>	0.212*** (0.045)	0.205*** (0.041)
Completed battles	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.010** (0.004)
Observations	36,998	36,998
Events	92	92
Frailty term (War)	✓	✓

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix F: A Multistate Model

For the sake of familiarity and accessibility, the main paper opts to use a series of logistic regressions and Cox proportional hazard models to understand the propensity and effects of intra-war negotiations. This introduces some issues, since the hazard model treats negotiations—the outcome variable in most models—as an exogenous variable. Moreover, a great deal of serial correlation in the negotiation data suggests that the act of (not) negotiating is better treated as a transition from one phase to another, rather than a discrete choice made at each time t . See Table 8. This is indeed how negotiations work: Parties agree to meet for sustained periods of time, and do not constantly restart talks once they fail. Furthermore, although the bargaining model of war implies that negotiations set the stage for settlements, factors that encourage diplomatic communications may not be the same or have the same effect as those that push wars to a conclusion (Findley 2012).

		To ($t + 1$)		
		No Negotiation	Negotiation	Termination
From (t)	No Negotiation	30,655 (0.992)	204 (0.007)	52 (0.002)
	Negotiation	167 (0.028)	5,788 (0.966)	40 (0.007)

Table 8: Transition matrix showing potential state changes from day t to day $t + 1$ of a war. Proportions per row in parentheses.

Model Overview

All these considerations point to the use of a multistate Markov model.³⁵ Metzger and Jones (2016) provide a useful overview and justification of multistate models, so I will limit my discussion to key points relevant to this study. A multistate model is a series of stratified Cox hazard models, where we determine what factors may influence the duration of a single phase before it transitions to another. In our context, a multistate model lets us analyze when and how wars enter and exit negotiations, as well as when and how they end, in a single setting.³⁶ Wars can move in and out of negotiations until they eventually come to an end. Moreover, unlike a logistic regression, multistate models allow for variables to have different effects for each transition (Beck 2008).

³⁵I use the R package `msm` (Jackson 2011).

³⁶An alternative might be separate logit and hazard models for negotiations and terminations, respectively.

We must define the potential states during war. Figure 14 illustrates the three states included in my model, as well as their relationships. Each war-day is one of three states: war without negotiations (W), war with negotiations (N), or termination of conflict (T). Periods with negotiations can include active hostilities; the main distinction is whether or not negotiations take place. The model permits repeated movement in and out of negotiations (recursive transitions), and war can terminate from either state. This reflects the fact that some wars do end with military activity. War termination is an absorbing state; every conflict eventually reaches this point and then is finished.

Returning briefly to Table 8, the large entries in the table were for $W \rightarrow W$ (fighting without negotiations) and $N \rightarrow N$ (remaining in negotiations) indicate high serial correlation in the data. This enhances the case for using a Markov model.³⁷ These states are the outcome variables we seek to explain.

Results

Table 9 displays the results from a simple model that looks only at the effect of being a post-1945 conflict. Note that the entire table encompasses one model, with each column reflecting the results for a particular transition. The first and second columns, when considered sequentially, present corroborating evidence for Hypothesis 1. The positive coefficient for entering negotiations ($W \rightarrow N$) indicates that post-1945 wars tend to enter negotiations more quickly. The negative coefficient for $N \rightarrow W$ then shows that once post-1945 wars are in a state of negotiation, they




Figure 14: State diagram of war. The letters W , N , and T are abbreviations used throughout the results.

³⁷Processes with the Markov property are considered to be memoryless; the conditional probability of the state in time $t + 1$ is only dependent on factors at time t and not the times before it.

tend to stay there longer compared to pre-1945 conflicts. Put together, these results show that negotiations start more quickly and last longer—and thus, are more common—in post-1945 wars.

The last column of Table 9 speaks to Hypothesis 2, which predicted that negotiations in post-1945 conflicts should be less likely to result in the termination of conflict. The negative and statistically significant coefficient strongly supports the notion that negotiations in post-1945 conflicts are much less likely to terminate conflicts than negotiations in pre-1945 conflicts.

Table 10 adds a series of control variables. It appears that the post-1945 environment may not explain when negotiations begin (non-significant effect for $W \rightarrow N$). However, when negotiations do occur, some feature of the post-1945 environment decreases their likelihood of being ended (negative coefficient for $N \rightarrow W$). This supports Hypothesis 1. Additionally, the post-1945 variable helps to explain the decreased likelihood of negotiations leading to the overall termination of hostilities (negative coefficient for $N \rightarrow T$), which bolsters Hypothesis 2.³⁸

Estimates for some of the other variables are also worth mention and highlight the utility of allowing factors to have differential effects on individual transitions. Issue salience appears to hamper the initiation of negotiations ($W \rightarrow N$) as well as their success ($N \rightarrow T$). This suggests that the key disagreement of the war undermines diplomatic efforts. Positive coefficients on post-Cold War for $W \rightarrow N$ and $N \rightarrow W$ suggest that more recent wars have bounced in and out of negotiations more frequently, but this activity also has no further impact on patterns of war termination. Such findings arguably provide more evidence for my argument: International pressures may have become

Table 9: Multistate model on the post-1945 shift without controls. Standard errors in parentheses, and hazard ratios in brackets.

	<i>Transition:</i>			
	$W \rightarrow N$	$N \rightarrow W$	$W \rightarrow T$	$N \rightarrow T$
Post-1945	0.639*** (0.141) [1.895]	-0.515*** (0.155) [0.597]	0.756*** (0.278) [2.129]	-1.595*** (0.365) [0.203]
Observations	36,998	36,998	36,998	36,998
Log-likelihood	-2,587.190			

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

³⁸Note that looking at transitions from $N \rightarrow T$ is analogous to the Post-1945 \times Negotiation interaction term in the main paper's proportional hazard model, except that negotiations are treated as a potential state in the multistate model.

even higher and easier to exert—perhaps to a fault—once Cold War tensions dissipated. Lastly, positive estimates for momentum across all four transitions shows that clear recent battlefield trends play an important role in forcing belligerents to consider new strategies.³⁹

Next, I address the role of nuclear belligerents and how they impact the post-1945 variable. Table 11 represents a basic multistate model with only the nuclear belligerent variable. The estimated coefficients' signs and levels of significance are very similar to those found for the post-1945 indicator in Table 9.

Table 12 replicates the full multistate model from Table 10 but includes the nuclear belligerent variable. We can see a slightly more nuanced set of results than what the survival model showed in the main text (Model 3 of Table 7). The presence of nuclear belligerents helps promote the initiation (positive coefficient for $W \rightarrow N$) and persistence (negative coefficient for $N \rightarrow W$), which attests to Hypothesis 1. However, nuclear belligerents do not appear to have an impact on whether wars terminate through hostilities or whether negotiations have an impact on the diplomatic settlement of conflict. The post-1945 variable no longer has an impact on the occurrence or non-occurrence of negotiations, but does undermine the likelihood of negotiations leading to the termination of hostilities. This supports Hypothesis 2, and provides one basis for why nuclear belligerents should not be considered to fully capture the post-1945 shift.

³⁹See Min (2017) for more thoughts on and tests of the connection between battlefield activity and negotiation behavior.

Table 10: Multistate model on the post-1945 shift with controls. Standard errors in parentheses, and hazard ratios in brackets.

	<i>Transition:</i>			
	$W \rightarrow N$	$N \rightarrow W$	$W \rightarrow T$	$N \rightarrow T$
Post-1945	0.303 (0.191) [1.353]	-0.615** (0.252) [0.541]	0.232 (0.342) [1.261]	-1.47*** (0.519) [0.23]
Issue salience	-0.859*** (0.153) [0.423]	-0.029 (0.174) [0.971]	-0.555* (0.312) [0.574]	-1.081** (0.433) [0.339]
Contiguity	-0.286* (0.169) [0.751]	0.566*** (0.218) [1.760]	0.396 (0.340) [1.486]	0.792* (0.431) [2.207]
CINC ratio	0.006* (0.003) [1.006]	0.001 (0.003) [1.001]	0.014*** (0.005) [1.014]	-0.037 (0.023) [0.964]
Democracy	0.317* (0.166) [1.373]	0.155 (0.182) [1.168]	0.780** (0.319) [2.182]	-0.102 (0.384) [0.903]
Interwar period	0.189 (0.202) [1.208]	-0.195 (0.266) [0.823]	-0.445 (0.439) [0.641]	-0.914* (0.481) [0.401]
Post-Cold War	1.065*** (0.231) [2.902]	1.394*** (0.267) [4.032]	-0.034 (0.532) [0.966]	0.731 (0.734) [2.077]
<i>Position</i>	0.012 (0.008) [1.012]	-0.021** (0.010) [0.979]	0.032* (0.017) [1.033]	0.010 (0.025) [1.01]
<i>Momentum</i>	0.109*** (0.032) [1.115]	0.077** (0.036) [1.080]	0.157*** (0.047) [1.170]	0.101** (0.046) [1.106]
Completed battles	-0.005** (0.002) [0.995]	0.002 (0.002) [1.002]	-0.014** (0.005) [0.986]	-0.005 (0.004) [0.995]
Observations	36,998	36,998	36,998	36,998
Log-likelihood	-2,470.710			

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Multistate model on nuclear belligerents without controls. Standard errors in parentheses, and hazard ratios in brackets.

	<i>Transition:</i>			
	$W \rightarrow N$	$N \rightarrow W$	$W \rightarrow T$	$N \rightarrow T$
Nuclear belligerent	0.589*** (0.216) [1.802]	-1.667*** (0.226) [0.189]	0.881** (0.403) [2.413]	-2.533*** (0.774) [0.079]
Observations	36,998	36,998	36,998	36,998
Log-likelihood	-2,554.024			

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Multistate model on nuclear belligerents with controls. Standard errors in parentheses, and hazard ratios in brackets.

	<i>Transition:</i>			
	<i>W</i> → <i>N</i>	<i>N</i> → <i>W</i>	<i>W</i> → <i>T</i>	<i>N</i> → <i>T</i>
Nuclear belligerent	0.605** (0.296) [1.831]	-1.291*** (0.37) [0.275]	0.326 (0.555) [1.385]	-0.809 (0.946) [0.445]
Post-1945	0.122 (0.217) [1.129]	-0.022 (0.293) [0.979]	0.133 (0.399) [1.142]	-1.268** (0.567) [0.281]
Issue salience	-0.870*** (0.153) [0.419]	0.055 (0.171) [1.056]	-0.556* (0.312) [0.573]	-0.965** (0.424) [0.381]
CINC ratio	0.003 (0.003) [1.003]	0.006 (0.004) [1.006]	0.013** (0.006) [1.013]	-0.031 (0.023) [0.969]
Democracy	0.186 (0.182) [1.204]	0.348* (0.182) [1.416]	0.701** (0.348) [2.015]	-0.004 (0.385) [0.996]
Contiguity	-0.218 (0.172) [0.804]	0.210 (0.238) [1.234]	0.437 (0.350) [1.548]	0.728* (0.438) [2.072]
Interwar period	0.197 (0.202) [1.217]	-0.059 (0.267) [0.943]	-0.405 (0.44) [0.667]	-0.854* (0.479) [0.426]
Post-Cold War	1.141*** (0.238) [3.130]	1.247*** (0.258) [3.481]	0.037 (0.544) [1.037]	0.701 (0.730) [2.015]
<i>Position</i>	0.012 (0.008) [1.012]	-0.011 (0.009) [0.989]	0.031* (0.017) [1.032]	0.013 (0.023) [1.014]
<i>Momentum</i>	0.106*** (0.032) [1.111]	0.066* (0.039) [1.068]	0.158*** (0.047) [1.171]	0.101** (0.045) [1.106]
Completed battles	-0.005** (0.002) [0.995]	0.003 (0.002) [1.003]	-0.014** (0.005) [0.986]	-0.005 (0.004) [0.995]
Observations	36,998	36,998	36,998	36,998
Log-likelihood	-2,461.78			

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

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