

Negotiation in War

Eric Min


Stanford University

October 22, 2016

What is the role of negotiations in the midst of war?

- Two-thirds of interstate wars end with a negotiated settlement.
Leventoğlu and Slantchev 2007
- In theory, negotiations are...
 - A way to codify outcomes once fighting determines the winner.
Fearon 1995; Goemans 2000; Powell 2006; Weisiger 2013
 - A constant and mechanical reflection of the battlefield.
Wagner 2000; Slantchev 2003; Wolford et al. 2011
 - Meant to help forge peace.
- But in practice, negotiations are...
 - Irregularly timed throughout the conflict.
 - Frequently unproductive in forging peace.
Langlois and Langlois 2012; Fearon 2013
- We do not fully understand how fighting interacts with negotiating.

- Negotiations are not only used to settle conflicts, but to fight (and potentially win) them.
- I call these *instrumental negotiations*.



- The effect of negotiations on war termination is *conditional* on fighting.
- I create two new daily-level datasets on battles and diplomatic activity.

Framework: Set-up

- Suppose a war begins between an *initiator* and a *target*.
- The initiator and target engage in battles.
- Fighting can range from being equitable to *lop-sided*.
 - When lop-sided, there is an *advantaged* and a *disadvantaged* party.
- Each side may choose to negotiate or not.

Lop-sided battlefield outcomes provide the ideal strategic space to use (instrumental) negotiations.

- Disadvantaged parties (two types)
 - Good-faith: Seek *peace*, reduce hostilities as costly signal
 - Instrumental: Seek *break*, initially mimic good-faith types
 - Deceive the opponent
 - Stall for time
 - Create breathing room to regroup, rearm, remobilize
- Advantaged parties
 - Relieve intense third-party pressures for peace
 - Take a gamble to potentially lock down wartime gains
- War targets
 - Mitigate the first-mover advantage.
 - Realize more of their true war-fighting potential.

Hypotheses

- 1 Lop-sided battle outcomes increase the likelihood of negotiations.
- 2 Periods with negotiations feature less fighting.
- 3 **Negotiations** that occur alongside **lop-sided battle outcomes** prolong wars, but **negotiations** alongside equitable fighting hasten the end of war.
- 4 Failed **negotiations** are followed by **battle outcomes that favor the war target**.



Battle Data

- Battles are a principal unit of combat.

Dupuy 1987

- Dates and outcomes for all battles after WWII.

Jaques 2007




- Assign each battle a score based on winner.

Winner	War Initiator	War Target	Inconclusive
Score	1	-1	0
Proportion	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.05)


Measures of Fighting

Two measures for each war-day:

- **Directional battle outcomes**
 - *LastMean*: Average score over previous five days with battles
- **Lop-sided battle outcomes**
 - $|LastMean|$: Degree of movement away from parity



(a) *LastMean*





(b) $|LastMean|$

Diplomacy Data

- Over 400 sources.
- Track war-days with **negotiations**.

No Negotiation	Negotiation	Total
9,422 (0.72)	3,751 (0.28)	13,173 (1.00)




H_3 : Negotiations + Lop-Sidedness \rightarrow Prolonged War

- H_3 : Negotiations alongside lop-sided battle outcomes prolong wars, but negotiations alongside equitable fighting hasten the end of war.
- Cox proportional hazard model with time-dependent covariates and clustered standard errors.
 - Outcome: War termination
 - Explanatory: $\text{Negotiation}_{w,t} \times |\text{LastMean}_{w,t-1}|$
 - Controls: Issue salience, contiguity, democracy, ceasefire, third-party urging, active battles

H_3 : Negotiations + Lop-Sidedness \rightarrow Prolonged War

- Survival curves show likelihood of events continuing/ending over time.
- See how differing values of negotiations and lop-sidedness affect adjusted/predicted survival curves.

Without negotiations




Lop-sided fighting outcomes *without* negotiations are more likely to *hasten* conflict termination.

H_3 : Negotiations + Lop-Sidedness \rightarrow Prolonged War

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- See how differing values of negotiations and lop-sidedness affect adjusted/predicted survival curves.


With negotiations



Lop-sided fighting outcomes *with* negotiations are more likely to *prolong* conflict.

H_4 : Failed Negotiations \rightarrow Gains for Target


- H_4 : Failed negotiations are followed by battle outcomes that favor the war target.
- Compare *LastMean* on 14 days before and after failed negotiations.
- OLS with war fixed effects and clustered standard errors and controls.



Fighting after failed negotiations favors the war target.

Conclusion


- Negotiations are a strategic tool of war that can undermine peace and prolong conflict.



- Instrumental negotiations reconcile gaps in theories and histories of war.
- Negotiations should not be unconditionally imposed or encouraged.

Conclusion

- New data allow for an unprecedented analysis of intra-war dynamics.



- How democracies fight/negotiate differently
- The effect of geography/proximity on conduct of war
- The strategic logic of when/where to fight battles

Thank you!