

Negotiation in War

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
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When and why do states negotiate during wars?

The Classic Black Box

- War initiation literature does not address subsequent activity.
Fearon 1995; Powell 2006
- War duration/termination literature adopts a “cannonball” approach.
Bennett and Stam 1996; Goemans 2000; Reiter 2009; Weisiger 2013
- Formal models of endogenous war have conflicting implications.
Filson and Werner 2002; Lewis and Schultz 2003; Powell 2004; Smith and Stam 2004; Leventoğlu and Tarar 2005; Wolford, Reiter, and Carrubba 2011
- About two-thirds of interstate wars end in negotiated settlement.
Pillar 1983; Leventoğlu and Slantchev 2007



- We require more targeted theory and data on negotiations during war.

- Initiating intra-war negotiations is *costly*, as it may signal weakness.
Schelling 1960; Iklé 1971; Pillar 1983; Smith 1995; Fearon 2007; Kaplow f.c.
- The post-1945 environment significantly mitigates the costs of engaging in intra-war diplomacy.
- Belligerents have more leeway to negotiate with no aim for peace... and may perhaps undermine it via “instrumental negotiations.”
- Belligerents can save face and stop fighting at points untenable before.

Key hypotheses:

- 1 Belligerents should participate in negotiations and mediation efforts more frequently in wars after 1945.
- 2 Before 1945, intra-war diplomacy should be strongly associated with the termination of conflict in wars. However, after 1945, intra-war diplomacy should be less associated with the termination of conflict.


- Battles are a principal unit of combat.
Dupuy 1987
- 1,682 battles across 91 COW interstate wars.
 - CDB90: 660 battles between 1600–1982 (444 across 24 COW wars)
Reiter and Stam 1998; Desch 2002; Ramsay 2008
- Attacker, defender, dates, results, and geocodings.
- Scores generated based on outcomes:

| Outcome | Proportion | Weight |
|----------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Decisive Initiator Victory | 0.023 | + <i>w</i> |
| Initiator Victory | 0.441 | 1 |
| Inconclusive | 0.043 | 0 |
| Target Victory | 0.461 | -1 |
| Decisive Target Victory | 0.032 | - <i>w</i> |


- Two measures:
 - *TotalProp*: Cumulative proportion of battles won/lost
 - *RunMean*: Average score over previous 60 days

Diplomatic Data

- Amassed from 400+ sources.
- Daily data on 15,000+ diplomatic events.
- Of interest in this study: Days of negotiations and mediation (6,012)



One War's Data



Results

| <i>Logistic Regression</i> | | <i>Cox PH Model</i> | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Negot. | | Duration |
| Post-1945 | 1.169** (0.544) | RunMean | 3.225*** (0.737) |
| RunMean | -0.523 (1.096) | Post-1945 | 0.827* (0.467) |
| Controls | ✓ | Diplomacy | 1.815*** (0.312) |
| Clustered SEs | ✓ | Post-1945 × Diplomacy | -2.730*** (0.619) |
| Observations | 38,681 | Controls | ✓ |
| R ² | 0.209 | Clustered SEs | ✓ |
| | | Observations | 38,681 |
| | | Events | 91 |

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

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Controls: Democracy, capabilities, nuclear weapons, Cold War, issue salience, UNSC resolutions, number of active battles

Conclusions and Next Steps

- Negotiations are a key component to understanding war.
- 1945 sparks a series of important normative and institutional changes, shifting the calculus of diplomacy during conflict.
- New data on intra-war dynamics leave a lot to be learned.

- Future questions...
 - Social welfare impacts: Is giving war a chance really better?
Luttwak 1999
 - How do states' capabilities influence interpretation of fighting outcomes?
 - Democracies: Do they negotiate and/or fight differently?
Gartzke 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002
 - Geographical dynamics: How much does it matter during war?

Thank You!