

## **GLBL ST 191 (Fall 2019)**

### **The Strategic Logic of War and Diplomacy**

*(Last updated November 5, 2019)*

**Instructor:** Professor Eric Min

**Email:** eric.min@ucla.edu

**Office:** Bunche Hall, Room 3254

**Office Hours:** Wednesdays, 2:00 - 4:00 PM

or by appointment

**Class:** Public Affairs 1256

Tuesdays/Thursdays

11:00 AM - 12:15 PM

### **Course Description and Learning Outcomes**

States are typically able to work out disagreements with other states in a peaceful manner by communicating through diplomacy. However, every once in a while, states abandon talking and resort to fighting. Wars are not very common, yet they are one of the most destructive activities humans pursue. One estimate concludes that over 137 million people have died from wars during the 20th century alone.<sup>1</sup>

Fortunately, wars eventually come to an end. Over the last two centuries, two-thirds of all wars between countries have ended through a negotiated agreement that stops conflict and restores peace before one side is completely destroyed.<sup>2</sup> These agreements are made using a familiar tool: diplomacy.

Three important ideas emerge from these observations. First, wars begin when diplomacy fails. Second, wars often end when diplomacy returns and succeeds. Third, neither war nor diplomacy can be fully understood without the other.

This course will explore why wars occur and how diplomacy impacts the way in which wars are conducted and concluded. This will take place in three phases with three objectives. In the first, we will focus on understanding why wars occur—or in other words, why diplomacy can fall short. We will find that even though wars often seem completely senseless and illogical, they are political and strategic activities that follow recognizable patterns. In the second, we will explore what factors impact how long wars last and why they end when they do. We will see that diplomacy is also a strategic activity, which makes it difficult (but not impossible) for diplomacy to resolve conflicts once they have begun. In the third, we will use in-class presentations and final papers to apply these insights to a variety of past

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<sup>1</sup>Leitenberg, Milton. 2006. "Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century." Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper #29.

<sup>2</sup>Leventoglu, Bahar and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2007. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 755-771.

and contemporary wars, as well as crises that could escalate to war. This will involve using our new theoretical tools and perspectives to think critically and scientifically about the logic behind these conflicts, while also identifying potential avenues for future research. Throughout the entire class, we will also work on improving our skills at communicating, both in written and spoken form.

This seminar will barely scratch the surface of what we know about war and diplomacy, and nothing we discuss is universally agreed upon. There are courses and individuals that just focus on any one of the subjects we will cover, and plenty of other important topics and perspectives were left out because we simply lack time. However, my hope is that the course will give you a better idea of the options you can keep pursuing in your own work.

## Course Requirements and Assessment

You will be assessed through the following, with these weights to your final grade:

- **Attendance and participation (25%):** This course is a seminar, and seminars only work (in other words, we won't sit in lots of awkward silence) when everyone comes to class, arrives on time, does the readings, and is prepared to talk about them. Your participation is critical to ensuring that the class is effective for everyone.

If you have any concerns or anxieties about speaking in class, please feel free to come talk to me during office hours. I am more than happy to discuss potential solutions.

- **Response papers (20%):** You will write three response papers of 1 to 2 pages (double-spaced, size 12 font, 1" margins) where you will discuss one of the readings that interests you. These are meant to be a chance to dive deeper into the material, to be a chance to get feedback about your writing before submitting the final paper, and to help inform class discussion. I will provide more guidance about these response papers in a separate document.

You have flexibility in when you submit these papers. However, the first paper must be submitted during Weeks 1 or 2; the second must be submitted during Weeks 3, 4, or 5; and the third must be submitted during Weeks 6, 7, or 8.

The three response papers will receive the following weights: 5%, 7%, and 8% (adding up to 20%).

You should send me your response paper via e-mail by 9:00 PM on the night prior to the class when the reading will be discussed.

- **Final paper (55%):** Most of your grade will be based on three assignments related to the final paper. You will apply what you have learned from the

course to analyze a contemporary conflict. More details about these assignments will be provided in a separate document once class enrollments are finalized.

- *Proposal (5%)*: You will write a paper 1 or 2 pages long stating which conflict you will analyze, as well as what points you plan to make about it. I do not expect you to have a finalized plan—we will not even be done covering all the material yet. This is a chance to outline what you generally hope to do so that I can provide feedback to help set the final paper in motion. Proposals are due by October 28 at 9:00 PM.
- *Presentation (10%)*: During the last few sessions of class, you will give a presentation of 10 to 15 minutes regarding the general argument and findings of your final paper.
- *Paper (40%)*: The paper should be 10 to 12 pages long excluding references. The final paper will be due by e-mail on Friday, December 13, by 5:00 PM.

Remember that the Undergraduate Writing Center provides free feedback and support on writing. Go to <http://uwc.ucla.edu> to make an appointment.

## Grading Scale

Grades will be determined using the following scale, where  $x$  represents your grade:

Score	Letter	GPA	Score	Letter	GPA
$94 \geq x$	A	4.0	$74 \leq x < 77$	C	2.0
$90 \leq x < 94$	A-	3.7	$70 \leq x < 74$	C-	1.7
$87 \leq x < 90$	B+	3.3	$67 \leq x < 70$	D+	1.3
$84 \leq x < 87$	B	3.0	$64 \leq x < 67$	D	1.0
$80 \leq x < 84$	B-	2.7	$60 \leq x < 64$	D-	0.7
$77 \leq x < 80$	C+	2.3	$x < 60$	F	0.0

The  $x$  notation is meant to indicate that there will be no rounding of grades. If you get an 89.9, that is a B+. Grades will not be curved.

## Readings

All required readings will be available on the CCLE page for this course.

## Course Policies

**General Conduct:** This course is a seminar, and seminars rely on everyone actively contributing to the discussion. Active contributions can only happen when each per-

son feels comfortable sharing and evaluating a range of ideas in an inclusive environment. To help this happen, we must all follow basic norms about thoughtful and respectful intellectual exchange. Please be professional in all your communications—both written and spoken. E-mails should be composed with proper punctuation and salutations. Written assignments should use professional language. Comments in class should be respectful of other students. Disagreements should be expressed using evidence and reasoned arguments instead of hostility. Any statements or actions that harass or discriminate on the basis of gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, and the like are unacceptable.

Faculty are required under the UC Policy on Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment to inform the Title IX Coordinator—a *non-confidential* resource—should they become aware that you or any other student has experienced sexual violence or sexual harassment.

**Academic Accommodations Based on a Disability:** Students needing academic accommodations based on a disability should contact the Center for Accessible Education (CAE) at (310) 825-1501 or in person at Murphy Hall A255. Please do so within the first two weeks of the term as reasonable notice is needed to coordinate accommodations. For more information, visit <http://www.car.ucla.edu>.

**Use of Laptops, Tablets, and Phones:** Laptops, and tablets are permitted for note-taking during this course. In exchange for trusting you to use these devices, I ask that you not use them as distractions. I maintain the right to change this policy for either individual students or the entire class if these tools become problems during class. Phones are not permitted.

**Academic Dishonesty:** As stated in the UCLA Student Conduct Code, violations or attempted violations of academic dishonesty include (but are not limited to) cheating, fabrication, plagiarism, multiple submissions, or facilitating any of the above. See <https://www.deanofstudents.ucla.edu/Individual-Student-Code> for more details. If you are ever unsure about whether something counts as academic dishonesty, chances are that it does, but always feel free to ask me as soon as possible. UCLA takes academic dishonesty very seriously and does not accept ignorance as a defense. Being caught for academic dishonesty not only affects your GPA, but will and must be reported to the Dean's Office and the Office of Student Conduct. This may lead to suspension, revocation of financial aid or scholarships, and/or dismissal. If you are having problems with coursework, there are clear and much better alternatives to academic dishonesty. Please come talk to me or consult the available student resources at <https://firsttogo.ucla.edu/Resources-for-Students/Campus-Resource>.

**Late Work:** Late papers will be penalized one full letter grade (10%) for each 24 hours they are submitted after the deadline. After 72 hours, papers will receive

a zero. Note that you may submit response papers at multiple points throughout the quarter. This flexibility should allow you to better fit those papers into your schedule.

**Medical Notes:** Should you have an illness or injury that prevents you from attending a class, please submit a statement of illness or injury. I will accept self-generated notes from the Ashe Center, but in exchange, I ask for you to be honest in your use of them.

**Other Personal Issues:** I understand that life can throw surprises that make it hard to focus on schoolwork. If you are experiencing a personal problem that is affecting your participation in this class, come speak with me. I would strongly prefer this to the misuse of medical notes to avoid classes. Please do not wait until the end of the quarter or after the quarter to talk about issues that impacted your academic performance. If you are not comfortable talking about these issues with me, please consider reaching out to the other student resources on campus, most of which are listed at <https://firsttogo.ucla.edu/Resources-for-Students/Campus-Resource>. Services exist to address counseling, student wellness, equity, sexual harassment, financial stress, and more. We all want you to succeed.

**Office Hours:** On most weeks, I will have office hours on Wednesdays between 2:00 PM and 4:00 PM. If you cannot make these scheduled office hours, tell me so that we can try to find a time that does work. You should feel free to come by and discuss class materials or anything else on your mind where you think I might be useful.

**E-mails:** You should contact me by e-mail when you have questions or concerns, but keep in mind that I may not respond until late evening and that I cannot guarantee responses during the weekend.

## Course Schedule

This is a tentative schedule and is subject to change. Changes will be posted online and announced in class.

All required readings, as well as all supplementary articles, are available on the course's CCLE page. Supplementary books are not online, but most are available at the library.

### September 26: Introductions and Course Overview

- No readings assigned.

## Part 1: Why Do Wars Start? Why Does Diplomacy Fail?

### October 1: What is War?

- von Clausewitz, Carl. 1989. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Originally published in 1832.)
  - Chapter 1 (pages 75-89).
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  - Chapter 1 (pages 1-34).
- Levy, Jack and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
  - Chapter 1 (pages 1-27).
- Supplementary:
  - Sun-Tzu. 1994. *The Art of War*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Originally published in the 5th century BCE.)
  - Sarkees, Meredith R. and Frank W. Wayman. 2010. *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-state, Intra-state, and Non-state Wars, 1816 - 2007*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
  - Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

**October 3: Deterring and Spiraling into War**

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  - Pages 35-55, 92-109.
- Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  - Pages 58-94.
- Supplementary:
  - Pages 94-113 of Jervis.
  - Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592.

**October 8: What is Diplomacy?**

- Roberts, Ivor. 2017. *Satow's Diplomatic Practice, Seventh Edition*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1917.)
  - Chapter 1 (pages 3-19).
- Trager, Robert F. 2017. *Diplomacy: Communication and the Origins of the International Order*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
  - Chapter 1 (pages 1-21).
- Katagiri, Azusa and Eric Min. 2019. "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach." *American Political Science Review* 113(1): 156-172.
- Supplementary:
  - Sartori, Anne E. 2005. *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  - Trager, Robert F. 2016. "The Diplomacy of War and Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 205-228.

**October 10: The Rationality of War**

*Response paper 1 should be submitted by 9 PM on October 9, if not already submitted.*

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- Weisiger, Alex. 2013. *Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  - Pages 11-33.
- Supplementary:
  - Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2017. "Information, Uncertainty, and War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 505-527.

**October 15: Rationalist Explanations and the Iraq War**

- Anderson, Terry H. 2011. *Bush's Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  - Chapter 2 (pages 93-129).
- Lake, David A. 2010/11. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security* 35(3): 7-52.
- Supplementary:
  - Jervis, Robert. 2003. "Understanding the Bush Doctrine." *Political Science Quarterly* 118(3): 365-388.



**October 17: Nationalism and Territory**

- Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." *International Security* 18(4): 5-39.
- Toft, Monica D. 2014. "Territory and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 185-198.
- Supplementary:
  - Gagnon, V. P. 1994/95. "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia." *International Security* 19(3): 130-166.
  - McCartney, Paul T. 2004. "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War." *Political Science Quarterly* 119(3): 399-423.
  - Walter, Barbara F. 2003. "Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict." *International Studies Review* 5(4): 137-153.
  - Schultz, Kenneth A. 2015. "Borders, Conflict, and Trade." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 125-145.

**October 22: Domestic Politics**

- Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 377-389.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and H. E. Goemans. 2003. "Peace Through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(4): 443-467.
- Supplementary:
  - Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and War." *Foreign Affairs* 74(3): 79-97.
  - Desch, Michael C. 2002. "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters." *International Security* 27(2): 5-47.
  - Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 326-347.

**October 24: Reputation and Status**

- Walter, Barbara F. 2006. "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 313-330.

- Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. 2014. "Reputation and Status as Motives for War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 371-393.
- Supplementary:
  - O'Neill, Barry. 1999. *Honor, Symbols, and War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
  - Renshon, Jonathan. 2016. "Status Deficits and War." *International Organization* 70(3): 513-550.

**Monday, October 28: Final Paper Proposal Due**

*Proposal due via e-mail (eric.min@ucla.edu) by 9:00 PM.*

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## Part 2: Why Do Wars Persist? When Does Diplomacy Matter Again?

### October 29: Diplomacy (and Backing Away) Is Hard

- Iklé, Fred C. 1971. *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia University Press.
  - Chapter 1 (pages 1-16) and Chapter 5 (84-105).
- Pillar, Paul R. 1983. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  - Chapter 2 (pages 44-89).
- Schwartz, Barry. 2005. “The Sunk-Cost Fallacy: Bush falls victim to a bad new argument for the Iraq War.” *Slate.com*, September 9. [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/hey\\_wait\\_a\\_minute/2005/09/the\\_sunkcost\\_fallacy.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2005/09/the_sunkcost_fallacy.html).
- Supplementary:
  - Staw, Barry M. 1981. “The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action.” *The Academy of Management Review* 6(4): 577-587.
  - Kaplow, Jeffrey M. 2016. “The Negotiation Calculus: Why Parties to Civil Conflict Refuse to Talk.” *International Studies Quarterly* 60(1): 38-46.

### October 31: The Bargaining Model of War

*Response paper 2 should be submitted by 9 PM on October 30, if not already submitted.*

- Reiter, Dan. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27-43.
- Weisiger, Alex. 2016. "Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration." *International Organization* 70(2): 347-375.
- Supplementary:
  - Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 469-484.
  - Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner. 2002. "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 819-837.
  - Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 621-632. (Definitely skip over the technical sections: "The Model" through "Markov Perfect Sequential Equilibrium.")
  - Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

### November 5: Leaders and Coalitions as Decisionmakers

- Goemans, H. E. 2000. "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 555-579.
- Stanley, Elizabeth A. and John P. Sawyer. 2009. "The Equifinality of War Termination: Multiple Paths to Ending War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(5): 651-676.
- Supplementary:
  - Chiozza, Giacomo and H. E. Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 604-619.
  - Croco, Sarah E. 2011. "The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 457-477.

**November 7: NO CLASS**

*Professor Min is at a conference. Congratulations. It would be a good idea to use this time to work on your final paper.*

**November 12: Reasons to Negotiate**

- Zartman, I. William. 2001. "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1(1): 8-18.
- Tangredi, Sam J. 1985. "Negotiation from Weakness: Achieving National Security Objectives from a Position of Strategic Inferiority." Master's Thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
  - Chapter 4 (pages 54-99).
- Min, Eric. 2019. "Negotiation as an Instrument of War." Working paper.
- Supplementary:
  - Chapter 5 of Tangredi (pages 100-126).
  - Huang, Reyko. 2016. "Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War." *International Security* 40(4): 89-126.
  - Min, Eric. 2019. "Talking while Fighting: Understanding the Role of Wartime Negotiations." Working paper.

**November 14: Third-Party Mediation**

- Walter, Barbara F. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51(3): 335-364.
- Melin, Molly M. 2014. "Commitment Problems: Understanding Variation in the Frequency of International Conflict Management Efforts." *International Negotiation* 19(1): 221-256.
- Supplementary:
  - Kydd, Andrew. 2003. "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.
  - Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. "Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management." *World Politics* 58(2): 207-241.
  - Howard, Lise Morjé and Alexandra Stark. 2017/18. "How Civil Wars End: The International System, Norms, and the Role of External Actors." *International Security* 42(3): 127-171.

**November 19: Durability of Post-Conflict Peace**

*Response paper 3 should be submitted by 9 PM on November 18, if not already submitted.*

- Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen. 2005. "Making and Keeping Peace." *International Organization* 59(2): 261-292.
- Fazal, Tanisha. 2014. "The Fall and Rise of Peace Treaties." *American Society of International Law Unbound* 108: 46-51.
- Supplementary:
  - Fortna, Page. 2004. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  - Fazal, Tanisha. 2013. "The Demise of Peace Treaties in Interstate War." *International Organization* 67(4): 695-724.
  - Findley, Michael G. 2013. "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(5): 905-932.

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**Part 3: How Do These Insights Apply to Current Conflicts?****November 21: Student Presentations**

*Presentations.*

**November 26: NO CLASS**

*Take the whole Thanksgiving week off!*

**November 28: NO CLASS**

*Thanksgiving.*

**December 3: Student Presentations**

*Presentations.*

**December 5: Student Presentations and Wrap-Up**

*Presentations and course wrap-up.*

- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Bradley A. Thayer, Jack S. Levy, and William R. Thompson. 2013. "The Forum: The Decline of War." *International Studies Review* 15(3): 386-419.

**Friday, December 13: Final Paper Due**

*Final paper due via e-mail (eric.min@ucla.edu) by 5:00 PM.*